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My dissertation is focused on developing a better understanding of the technology 
and innovation strategies of corporations and their impacts on firm performance. I am 
particularly interested in corporate venture capital (CVC), which serves as a strategy for 
accessing external technology for corporate investors and as an alternative source of 
financing and complementary assets for start-ups. I have investigated the conditions 
under which corporate investors and start-ups achieve the strategic goals by establishing 
CVC ties, and on estimating the technological and financial gains created by the CVC 
ties. Specifically, I have concentrated on when and where CVC ties are established in 
order to maximize economic value. The former relates to a timing issue, whereas the 
latter is a space issue of CVC investments.       
In the first essay, I examine corporate investors’ decisions to establish CVC ties 
and their subsequent strategic actions. Consistent with the real options perspective on 
CVC investments, I find that CVC investments can help corporate investors effectively 
search for and select future acquisition or licensing partners by reducing asymmetric 
information and uncertainty that may characterize markets for technology. Specifically, 
CVC investments facilitate the external acquisition of technology by substituting for a 
corporate investor’s absorptive capacity, as reflected by its upstream research 
capabilities. CVC investments instead complement the portfolio of internally generated 
new products, since they allow highly productive corporate investors to shift their focus 
onto exploratory initiatives with the objective of selecting future technology and partners. 
Finally, CVC investments facilitate exploratory investments in distant technological areas 
 xii 
that are subsequently integrated through licensing or acquisitions. These findings 
contribute to emerging research on the organization and financing patterns of external 
R&D activities.       
In the second essay, I investigate the nature of the relationship between 
technological spillovers and capital gains created by CVC investments for corporate 
investors. Using a simple equilibrium model and data from the global bio-pharmaceutical 
industry between 1986 and 2007, I find that these technological spillovers and capital 
gains are complements. This complementarity is enhanced when CVC investments are 
made in post-IPO and technologically diversified start-ups. Beyond providing a broad 
benchmark for heterogeneous returns on CVC investments, this study has important 
implications for corporate investors and start-ups. In particular, to the extent that capital 
gain is greatly determined by changes in the market values of start-ups, it implies that 
CVC investments can create value for start-ups as well as corporate investors. These 
mutual benefits can be greatly determined by when (e.g., post-IPO start-ups) and where 
(e.g., technologically diversified start-ups) CVC investments are made.     
In the third essay, I analyze the contextual factors that impact the probability of 
start-ups’ obtaining financing through independent venture capitalists and corporate 
investors. The systematic empirical evidence based on a three-stage game theoretic model 
suggests that start-ups that possess better evaluated technology tend to be financed 
through independent venture capitalists, rather than corporate investors. In contrast, start-
ups tend to be financed through corporate investors, rather than independent venture 
capitalists, when their intellectual properties are effectively protected and their research 
pipelines contain multiple products. These findings provide a theoretical basis to explain 
 xiii 
why several types of investors co-exist in the entrepreneurial financing market. 
Moreover, the existence of such determinants indicates that, although investors 
traditionally have been viewed as the powerful partner that dominates the investment 








 Intensive research and development (R&D) competition and substantial 
complexity in product development create an incentive for corporations to enhance their 
innovations. It is, however, well recognized that no single corporation has all necessary 
internal resources to achieve innovation because the sources of innovation are often 
broadly distributed across different organizations, industries, and sectors (Powell et al., 
1996). To cope with this limitation, corporations often choose a variety of organizational 
and financial arrangements for their external R&D activities. These arrangements contain 
several forms of external technology acquisition strategy, including corporate venture 
capital (CVC), acquisition, licensing, and strategic alliance. External R&D activities are 
particularly important for the bio-pharmaceutical industry, which has faced severe 
productivity challenges in the last decade and where significant levels of uncertainty and 
adverse selection problems are common (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 and 1994). As a 
result, effective decisions on external R&D activities are critical in generating profits for 
growth (e.g., Nicholson et al., 2005; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). 
 The emphasis on CVC as a strategy of collaboration between incumbents and 
start-ups continues to expand for several compelling reasons. These reasons include the 
escalating cost and cycle time of product development, increasing complexity of 
technology, and pursuit of efficient distribution of complementary assets. Corporate 
investors often use CVC investments as an ex-ante evaluation mechanism that helps them 
to effectively search for and select future technology partners (Gompers and Lerner, 
1998). As a result, CVC investments may contribute to help corporate investors facilitate 
innovation, strategic renewal, and organizational learning. In contrast, start-ups can use 
CVC investments as an alternative source of complementary assets and financing. Start-
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ups often face the “valley of death”, which describes the period of transition when a 
developing technology is deemed to be promising, but too new to validate its commercial 
potential, making it difficult to attract sources of financing. During this transition CVC 
provides not only capital but also complementary assets that would not be available from 
traditional funding sources such as independent venture capitalists and banks, playing an 
increasingly more important role in the entrepreneurial finance market.     
 The rise of CVC activities across organizational boundaries in the 1990s and 
2000s has attracted an emerging wave of research on the motivations of corporate 
investors. This literature suggests that corporate investors make CVC investments in 
order to redirect and guide their internal R&D activities through the utilization of 
knowledge spillovers originating from start-ups (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1998; 
Hellmann, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a and b, Benson and Ziedonis, 2010). As 
such, CVC investments can allow corporate investors to access novel technologies with 
lower risk by reducing asymmetric information and uncertainty. This reduction in 
asymmetric information and uncertainty also contributes to a larger supply of external 
technologies available to corporate investors for subsequent external R&D activities.   
 Although these studies have greatly improved our understanding of the conditions 
under which corporate investors can source external technology pursued by start-ups, 
they do not fully identify some of the key factors driving the optimal balance between 
CVC investments and other external technology acquisition strategies, with a particular 
focus on the time of these strategies. Moreover, many questions remain to be addressed 
for the motives of start-ups that raise funds from their projects from corporate investors 
rather than traditional funding sources and performance implications followed by 
establishing CVC ties. In this thesis, I ask the following question: What can we suggest to 
both corporate investors and start-ups about how to manage and benefit from CVC 
investments? This question is examined in greater detail in the following three essays.    
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1.1 Essay I 
 The first essay examines how CVC investments can aid corporate investors in 
achieving their strategic goals in the market for technology. It also examines what 
particular benefits that may not be realized by other types of external R&D activity are 
created by CVC investments. To address these issues, I provide a theoretical framework 
that suggests that CVC investments help corporate investors effectively search for and 
select future acquisition and licensing partners. I capture this timing issue associated with 
CVC investments, acquisition, and licensing in both my theoretical and empirical 
analyses. In a broad sense, these issues help us understand why several types of external 
R&D activities co-exist in the market for technology.   
 Using a novel dataset that includes a sample of 1,210 observations, corresponding 
to the internal and external R&D activities of 59 unique pharmaceutical firms during the 
years between 1985 and 2007, I first show that firms possessing high absorptive capacity, 
with particular reference to their ability to identify, assimilate, and utilize external 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), are likely to simultaneously engage in internal 
and external R&D activities, as widely supported in the management literature. However, 
and consistent with a real options perspective, I also show that conditional on the external 
utilization of technology markets these firms are likely to directly engage in licensing and 
acquisition, relative to making CVC investments. This is because these firms face 
relatively lower uncertainty and information asymmetry, thereby enhancing their ability 
to effectively evaluate and select technology partners.   
In contrast, and consistent with the literature on CVC as a window on future 
technology, I show that conditional on the external utilization of technology markets, 
firms experiencing relatively high internal productivity are more likely to make CVC 
investments prior to engaging in an acquisition or license because these firms can afford 
to nurture nascent technologies. In essence, since CVC investments are by their very 
nature exploratory initiatives (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b; 
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Basu et al., 2011), a firm with strong internal productivity can shift its focus to future 
technology partners and future productivity, thereby allocating a greater portfolio of its 
external activity to CVC relative to licensing or acquisitions. These effects of absorptive 
capacity and internal R&D productivity on the incentives to undertake CVC investments 
help us understand how firms balance these investments with other R&D activities. 
Finally, I use a real options perspective to address the issue of what corporate 
investors ultimately do with their CVC investments ex post. Indeed, I find that 
conditional upon making CVC investments, firms making such investments in 
technologically diversified fields are more likely to engage in subsequent acquisition or 
licensing. In other words, I show that CVC has an option value in that it provides an entry 
mechanism into more technologically unrelated markets that present greater investment 
uncertainties.     
 This essay makes two main contributions. First, it contributes to an emerging 
research on the organization and financing patterns of external R&D activities (e.g., 
Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Mathews, 2006; Robinson, 2008; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2009). 
This essay, unlike the extant literature which has focused on a singly type of external 
R&D activity, suggests that CVC investments should be considered in conjunction with 
other types of external R&D activity. This approach, I believe, is more appropriate 
because firms often pursue an R&D strategy which is composed of several types of 
external R&D activity simultaneously and sequentially. Second, this study also 
contributes to the literature on optimal organization and financing arrangements between 
corporate investors and start-ups (e.g., Hellmann, 2002; Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky 
and Shaver, 2009). Unlike that literature, however, which has investigated how resource 
constraints and appropriation problems affect the establishments of CVC ties, this study 
suggests that CVC investments can be greatly determined by timing, which ultimately 
affects the level of asymmetric information and uncertainty found in the market for 
technology.  
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1.2 Essay II 
 In the second essay, I analyze the nature of relationship between technological 
spillovers and capital gains created by CVC investments and identify the factors 
associated with the relationship. The technological spillovers come from exposure and 
access to external technologies and products, while the capital gains come through the 
selling of stocks in an IPO, acquisitions of start-ups by third-parties, or other types of 
liquidation events. An example is the investment by the CVC arm of Eli Lilly and 
Company in Millennium Pharmaceuticals Inc., in 1995. Eli Lilly received technological 
benefits from the collaborative research efforts into the genetic causes of atherosclerosis 
and congestive heart failure – it also received a substantial financial gain from the IPO of 
Millennium Pharmaceuticals in 1996.    
 An understanding of these issues is important because it sheds light on the 
motives of corporate investors and on whether CVC investments ultimately create a 
positive total return for corporate investors. Moreover, to the extent that capital gains are 
largely a reflection of the changes in the market values of start-ups in which CVC 
investments are made, the nature of the interaction indicates whether CVC investments 
create mutual benefits between corporate investors and start-ups. Such a mutuality of 
benefits may well play a key role in determining the success or failure of CVC 
investments. Beyond just the nature of the relationship, my understanding of contextual 
factors impacting the relationship is important because it can help corporate investors 
balance technological and financial benefits (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 2004) and thus 
increase the total return created by CVC investments. In addition, these contextual factors 
can be understood to facilitate the mutual benefits between corporate investors and start-
ups.   
To address these issues, I develop a simple and flexible model that analyzes the 
nature of the relationship between technological spillovers and capital gains, and gives 
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rise to testable empirical implications. By evaluating the technological and financial 
benefits created by 71 bio-pharmaceutical corporate investors between 1985 and 2005, I 
present novel and systematic evidence that supports the existence of a positive 
relationship between these two benefits. Moreover, consistent with the predictions made 
in the model, my findings suggest that this positive relationship is enhanced when CVC 
investments are made in post-IPO and technologically diversified start-ups, respectively.    
This essay contributes to different strands of the literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature on CVC investments by providing systematic estimates of technological and 
financial benefits crated by CVC investments and their relationship. The essay thus 
extends the prior studies that have focused on either one of the two benefits and helps 
better evaluate the costs and benefits of CVC investments. Second, and more broadly, 
this study contributes to the literature on the way in which firms organize and finance 
their R&D investments. While one perspective suggests that active pursuit of capital 
gains can come at the cost of technological benefits (e.g., Rind, 1981; Chesbrough, 2002; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2004), an alternative perspective is that corporate investors can 
pursue these two benefits simultaneously. My findings are consistent with the latter 
perspective. Thus, corporate investors can use CVC investments as a strategy to facilitate 
their external R&D activities at a lower cost. 
1.3 Essay III 
The third essay is focused on start-ups’ financial arrangements for their growth 
and success by investigating the trade-offs involved with their choice between corporate 
investors (CVCs) and independent venture capitalists (IVCs) and its performance 
implications. It studies two interrelated questions: (1) When do start-ups finance their 
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projects from CVCs and IVCs? and (2) How do these two entrepreneurial financing 
sources create value for start-ups? 
 To analyze these issues, I develop a three-stage game theoretic model that 
distinguishes CVCs and IVCs in several ways, some of which are as follows. First, unlike 
IVCs that primarily pursue capital gains, CVCs seek strategic benefits from technological 
spillovers originated from start-ups as well as capital gains (MacMillan et al., 2008). 
Second, start-ups face a substantial risk of appropriation when they disclose their 
technology/products to CVCs. IVCs have a minimal chance to appropriate start-ups’ 
technology compared with CVCs because they do not normally seek such strategic 
benefits sought by CVCs. Third, CVCs can provide their assets and capabilities, 
including technological and R&D support, product development assistance, 
manufacturing capacities, and access to marketing and distribution channels, to create 
value for start-ups. In contrast, IVCs can help start-ups access the capital markets by 
better signaling start-ups’ value to the capital markets. My model considers these unique 
attributes of these two financing sources and relates start-ups’ costs and benefits of 
associating with their choices.    
By analyzing 3,885 fundraising records of 616 bio-pharmaceutical start-ups 
between 1985 and 2006, I first find that start-ups tend to finance their projects from 
CVCs rather than IVCs when they are in the later stages and need a relatively small 
amount of capital. Second, start-ups that possess better evaluated technology tend to raise 
funds for their projects from IVCs rather than CVCs. Third, start-ups tend to raise funds 
for their projects from CVCs rather than IVCs when their intellectual property is 
effectively protected and their research pipelines contain multiple products. Finally, while 
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financing from IVCs contributes to increasing start-ups’ Tobin’s q and valuation, 
financing from CVCs contributes to enhancing forward patent citations.     
This study contributes to various strands of finance and management literature. 
First, it contributes to the literature on the formation of CVC investment ties (e.g., 
Hellmann, 2002; Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). While the existing 
studies take the perspective of CVCs by assuming that investors dominate entrepreneurial 
finance decisions, this study takes the perspective of start-ups that can also be active 
decision-makers in their investment ties. Second, this study contributes to the literature 
on the trade-offs between the better evaluation of projects and the threat of appropriation 
(e.g., Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Gans et al., 2008). While much of this literature 
considers a single type of investor, this study advances our understanding about why 
several types of investors co-exist in the entrepreneurial finance market by highlighting 




CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL AS AN EX-ANTE 




Why do firms make corporate venture capital (CVC) investments? A growing 
body of literature has suggested that firms often make CVC investments in research-
intensive start-ups to help facilitate innovation, strategic renewal, and organizational 
learning.
1
 This question, however, remains unresolved since firms can satisfy such 
strategic motives through engaging in other types of external R&D activity, such as 
acquisition and licensing. Indeed, we know little about why firms particularly choose to 
make CVC investments among the various types of external R&D activities available to 
them. The answer to this question is critical in helping us understand two interrelated 
questions: 1) how CVC investments can aid firms to achieve their strategic goals in the 
market for technology, and 2) what particular benefits, which may not be realized by 
other types of external R&D activity, are created by CVC investments. In a broad sense 
these issues help us understand why several types of external R&D activity co-exist in the 
market for technology. 
  
                                                 
1
 For example, these strategic motives of CVC investments have been discussed in several studies including 
Sykes (1986 and 1990), Siegel et al. (1988), Gompers and Lerner (1998), Anand and Galetovic (2000), 
Chesbrough (2002), Hellmann (2002), Maula and Murray (2002), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a, 2005b, 
and 2006), Nicholson et al. (2005), Wadhwa and Kotha (2006), Allen and Hevert (2007), Benson and 
Ziedonis (2008 and 2010), Katila et al. (2008), Keil et al. (2008), Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009), and 
Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009). Moreover, several surveys have reported that corporate investors make CVC 
investments primarily to pursue strategic motives (e.g., Siegel et al., 1988; Corporate Strategy Board, 2000; 
Kann, 2000; Asset Alternatives, 2002; Birkinshaw et al., 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006; MacMillan 
et al., 2008). 
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To address these issues I build on two different research streams. The first is the 
literature on CVC as a window for future technology (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1998; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a, 2005b, and 2006; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Keil et al., 
2008). This literature suggests that corporate investors make CVC investments in order to 
redirect and guide their internal R&D activities through the utilization of knowledge 
spillovers originating from start-ups. As such, CVC investments can help corporate 
investors effectively search for and select future acquisition or licensing partners by 
reducing asymmetric information and uncertainty that may characterize markets for 
technology, thereby allowing them to access novel technologies with lower risk. This 
reduction in asymmetric information and uncertainty eventually contributes to a larger 
supply of external technologies available to corporate investors for subsequent licensing 
or acquisition. On the other hand, if corporate investors do not choose to engage in a 
subsequent acquisition or license, they can liquidate the start-up’s equity from their 
investment portfolio. 
The second research stream I consider is the literature on real options (e.g., Van 
De Vrande et al., 2006; Benson and Ziedonis, 2008 and 2010; Li and Mahoney, 2011; 
Van De Vrande and Vanhaverbeke, 2009; Krychowski and Quélin, 2010; Ziedonis, 
2007). Real options theory can be readily integrated with the literature on CVC as a 
window for future technology. This framework indeed suggests that corporate investors 
use CVC investments as an option to proceed or defer other types of external R&D 
activity. From this perspective, there are three distinguishable characteristics of CVC 
investments that affect their option value. These are low commitment, high reversibility, 
and high independency. First, low commitment suggests that CVC investments, unlike 
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acquisitions and licenses, often require smaller financial and organizational commitment 
(McGrath and Nerkar, 2004; Van De Vrande et al., 2006). Second, high reversibility 
implies that corporate investors can liquidate their equity investment if they decide not to 
engage in a subsequent acquisition or license with the portfolio firm. Finally, high 
independency suggests that CVC investments generally do not directly affect the current 
organizational and technological resources of corporate investors. In summary, these 
characteristics collectively allow CVC investors to stay nimble and provide them with the 
opportunity to move in and out of nascent technological opportunities more quickly. 
 The synthesis of the above frameworks allows us to identify some of the key 
factors driving the optimal balance between external technology acquisition strategies, 
with a particular focus on the timing of these strategies. Indeed, I first show that firms 
possessing high absorptive capacity, with particular reference to their ability to identify, 
assimilate, and utilize external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), are likely to 
simultaneously engage in internal and external R&D activities, as widely supported in the 
management literature. However, and consistent with a real options perspective, I also 
show that conditional on the external utilization of technology markets these firms are 
likely to directly engage in licensing or acquisition, relative to making CVC investments. 
This is because these firms face relatively lower uncertainty and information asymmetry, 
thereby enhancing their ability to effectively evaluate and select technology partners. In 
other words, I propose and find that CVC investments and a firm’s absorptive capacity 
are substitute drivers in their attempts to be innovative through the use of technology 
markets.   
In contrast, and consistent with the literature on CVC as a window on future 
technology, I show that conditional on the external utilization of technology markets, 
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firms experiencing relatively high internal productivity are more likely to make CVC 
investments prior to engaging in an acquisition or license because these firms can afford 
to nurture nascent technologies. In essence, since CVC investments are by their very 
nature exploratory initiatives (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b; 
Basu et al., 2011), a firm with strong internal productivity can shift its focus to future 
technology partners and future productivity, thereby allocating a greater portion of its 
external activity to CVC relative to licensing or acquisitions. 
 The effect of absorptive capacity and internal R&D productivity on the incentives 
to undertake CVC investments helps us understand how firms balance these investments 
with other R&D activities. I also use a real option perspective to address the issue of what 
corporate investors ultimately do with their CVC investments ex post. Indeed, I argue that 
conditional upon making CVC investments, firms making such investments in 
technologically diversified fields are more likely to engage in subsequent acquisition or 
licensing. In other words, I show that CVC has an option value in that it provides an entry 
mechanism into more technologically unrelated markets that present greater investment 
uncertainties.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents my theoretical 
framework and hypotheses. The subsequent section describes my empirical strategy and 
data. I then report empirical results and conclude. 
2.2 Theory and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Related Literature 
Research intensive firms often need to reach out beyond their boundaries in order 
to enhance research productivity. They can access the external technology market in a 
number of ways, for example, through acquisitions, licenses, corporate venture capital 
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investments, alliances, and joint ventures. For the purposes of this study I focus on three 
specific modes of technology acquisition: licensing, acquisitions and CVC investments. 
While prior research has already demonstrated the individual importance of each of these 
in enhancing productivity, I focus on the possible role that CVC investments play as a 
potential ex ante evaluation mechanism in the market for technology.
2
 
Because uncertainty regarding future payoffs associated with technologies 
generated outside a firm’s boundaries is common, firms should have the capacity and 
capability to evaluate external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990). In 
order to improve this capability firms often use a stage-gate process which adds new 
technological information to their information base stepwise (Van De Vrande et al., 
2006). If a particular type of external R&D activity can be used to increase this 
familiarity, at a low enough cost, prior to engaging in other types of external R&D 
activity which may require substantial and irreversible investments, then this activity can 
function like a stage-gate process, thereby reducing uncertainty and adverse selection.  
My theoretical framework assumes that firms use CVC investments in exactly this 
manner. In particular, I argue that CVC investments serve as an ex ante evaluation 
mechanism that corporate investors use to identify and select potential future licensing 
partners or acquisition targets. Through a CVC investment program, which includes 
identifying, evaluating, selecting, and monitoring external technologies, corporate 
investors are able to access and observe new and novel technologies (Siegel et al., 1988; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998). For example, CVC investment programs also allow 
                                                 
2
 See for example, acquisitions (e.g., Bradley et al. 1988; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; Houston et al., 
2001; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Ceccagnoli and Higgins, 2011), licensing (e.g., Grindley and 
Nickerson, 1996; Lin, 1996; Arora et al., 2001; Cassiman et al., 2005), and CVC investments (e.g., 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a, 2005b, and 2006; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009; 
Benson and Ziedonis, 2008 and 2010). 
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corporate investors to visit the business sites of start-ups or sit on the board of directors 
(Bottazzi et al., 2004).
3
 This process helps corporate investors obtain better information 
and provides learning opportunities about external technologies. It also provides a lower 
risk mechanism for corporate investors to invest in technologies that may be less related 
to their existing technologies (Kulatilaka and Toschi, 2010), an issue which I explore 
more fully below.  
With more information and a reduction in risk, corporate investors can more 
effectively decide if and when to eventually integrate their portfolio holding. If the 
corporate investor chooses not to internalize a portfolio holding, it can still choose to hold 
that investment through a liquidity event, potentially providing a financial return back to 
the CVC investment program or fund. They may choose not to integrate for a number of 
reasons; for example, the portfolio company’s technology may not have progressed 
sufficiently. Regardless of the reason, however, the use of a CVC investment program 
helps mitigate risk by helping the corporate investor to avoid committing substantial 
resources to an inappropriate technology partner or research program.  
2.2.2 Model Specification 
In this section I integrate some of the ideas outlined above within a stylized 
discrete choice model, which will allow us to better structure the development of my 
hypotheses. In particular, I start by arguing that, to introduce new products or processes, a 
firm makes a three-stage R&D decision that can be summarized as follows. At the first 
stage, a firm faces two options: Invest only in internal R&D activities and develop its 
own technologies (Internal R&D only) or invest in internal R&D activities and engage in 
                                                 
3
 As board members, corporate investors gain access to more information than would be available without 
such involvement (Katila et al., 2008). 
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at least one type of external R&D activity (Internal and External R&D).
4
 At the second 
stage, conditional on the choice of Internal and External R&D, firms can engage in 
acquisitions or licensing (Acq./Lic.) or make CVC investments (CVC). Finally, at the 
third stage, conditional on the choice of CVC, firms can engage in subsequent 
acquisitions or licensing with the firms in which they have made CVC investments (Post 
CVC Acq./Lic.), or continue to hold the firms in their portfolio or liquidate (Other). 
Consistent with this decision tree, I define    {       } as the alternative that 
each firm i chooses, which may incorporate a set of sequential activities as follows. 
     corresponds to Internal R&D only.      corresponds to a firm engaging in 
Internal and External R&D at the first stage and acquisition or licensing without prior 
CVC investments at the second stage.      corresponds to a firm engaging in Internal 
and External R&D at the first stage, a CVC investment at the second stage, and 
acquisition or licensing at the post-CVC third stage.      corresponds to a firm 
engaging in Internal and External R&D at the first stage, a CVC investment at the second 
stage, and some Other unspecified event post-CVC which is different than an acquisition 
or license, such as maintaining the CVC in the firm’s portfolio or liquidation.  
The payoffs associated with this decision tree are specified as follows. Let    
denote the payoff to the firm if it chooses Internal R&D only and    if it chooses Internal 
and External R&D at the first stage. Let    denote the payoff to the firm if it chooses 
Acq./Lic. and    if it chooses CVC at the second stage. Finally, let    denote the payoff to 
the firm if it chooses Post CVC Acq./Lic. and    if it chooses Other at the third stage. The 
description of the decision tree and a summary of these choices are presented in Figure 
2.1 and Table 2.1. 
                                                 
4
 Although a firm could in principle also engage exclusively in external R&D activities, I exclude this 
possibility from the menu of choices. Indeed, in my setting, the pharmaceutical industry, I do not observe 
firms that exclusively engage in external R&D activities without conducting internal R&D. As such, the 




Figure 2.1. A three-stage sequential decision model 
 
Table 2.1. Specification of choice variable 
 
  Choice Specification 
1. Internal R&D only Firms that engage in internal R&D activities only (    ) 
2. Internal and External R&D 
Firms that engage in internal R&D activities and at least one of the above types 
of external R&D activities simultaneously (    ) 
2.1. Acq./Lic. 
Firms that engage in acquisition or licensing without prior CVC investments 
(    ) 
2.2. CVC Firms that make CVC investments (    ) 
2.2.1. Post CVC Acq./Lic. 
Firms that engage in subsequent acquisition or licensing with partner firms in 
which they made CVC investments previously (    ) 
2.2.2 Other 
Firms that do not engage in subsequent acquisition or licensing with partner 
firms in which they made CVC investments previously (    ). 
 
If I further incorporate additive stochastic components to each payoff, assume that 
these are independent and identically distributed across payoffs with a Type 1 extreme 
value distribution which are observed by the firm but not the econometrician, and 
normalize the payoffs to achieve identification, I can define the probabilities for each 
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In what follows, I will use equations (1.1)-(1.6) to better articulate my hypotheses with 
reference to the relative payoffs affecting each probability of interest.    
2.2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The simplified discrete choice model depicted in Figure 2.1 implies that the three-
stage sequential choices faced by firms can be influenced by specific contextual factors. 
For example, while a particular variable may impact the choice between Internal R&D 
only and Internal and External R&D (Stage 1), another variable may impact the choice 
between Acq./Lic. and CVC (Stage 2) and/or Post CVC Acq./Lic. and Other (Stage 3). 
Moreover, a variable that impacts the choice between Internal R&D only and Internal 
and External R&D (Stage 1) could also impact the choice between Acq./Lic. and CVC 
(Stage 2) and/or the Post CVC Acq./Lic. and Other (Stage 3). I develop my hypotheses by 
identifying relevant factors that affect these sequential choices. I group these factors by 
corresponding stage.  
Stage 1: Absorptive capacity 
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The extant literature widely recognizes that a firm’s capacity to be innovative 
through external R&D activities is greatly determined by its internal competency in 
identifying and integrating appropriate external technologies or know-how. This 
competency or “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990) stresses the 
importance of a firm’s stock of prior knowledge to effectively identify, evaluate, 
integrate, and commercialize external technologies. In my model, I argue that absorptive 
capacity impacts a firm’s choice between Internal R&D only and Internal and External 
R&D at the first stage and also between Acq./Lic. and CVC at the second stage. 
Because sufficient absorptive capacity is often critical to increase marginal returns 
to external R&D activities, it can help a firm engage in several types of external R&D 
activity (e.g., Arora and Gambardella, 1990 and 1994; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). These increases in 
marginal returns are often achieved by reductions in the uncertainty and information 
asymmetries associated with the nature and value of external technologies. A firm that 
possesses insufficient absorptive capacity, in contrast, can face higher levels of 
uncertainty, finding it more difficult to have successful external R&D activities. As a 
result, higher absorptive capacity increases the payoffs from Internal and External R&D 
(  ), which decreases the relative payoffs from the first stage choice (     ). In other 
words, a firm that possesses high absorptive capacity faces relatively lower uncertainty 
and information asymmetry, thereby enhancing its capacity to effectively evaluate and 
select technology partners, and vice versa. I thus posit the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms possessing higher absorptive capacity are more likely to 
engage in internal and external R&D activities simultaneously, relative to 
engaging in only internal R&D activities. 
 
This hypothesis has been widely examined in the existing literature (e.g., Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). However, my revisit of this issue is important because, while the 
existing literature has considered absorptive capacity an important factor that determines 
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a firm’s innovative performance through external R&D activities, my model suggests that 
absorptive capacity is a critical condition under which the firm engages in several 
different types of external R&D activity. A deeper understanding of this issue helps us to 
effectively address how absorptive capacity can work in the context of CVC relative to 
other choices available to a firm.  
Stage 2: Absorptive capacity and internal productivity 
At the second stage, absorptive capacity can also determine a firm’s choice 
between Acq./Lic. and CVC. I argue that conditional on having sufficient absorptive 
capacity to engage in Internal and External R&D, firms possessing higher levels of 
absorptive capacity tend to engage in acquisitions or licenses without prior CVC 
investments. These firms can effectively evaluate external technologies without the 
additional information obtained through CVC investments. This high level of absorptive 
capacity may also decrease the value of CVC investments as real options because the 
associated uncertainty and information asymmetry are lower.
5
 In this instance    
increases,    decreases, and the difference (     ) increases. Firms possessing 
insufficient absorptive capacity, in contrast, would be more inclined to make CVC 
investments prior to engaging in acquisitions or licenses. These firms may need either 
more information or more time to learn about external technologies. The use of these 
types of investments may help attenuate uncertainty or information asymmetries, thereby 
increasing    and decreasing (     ). As such, conditional on choosing Internal and 
External R&D, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a. Firms possessing higher absorptive capacity are less likely to 
make CVC investments, relative to engaging in acquisition or licensing.  
 
At first blush, this hypothesis may appear to contradict Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b), 
who find that firms possessing greater absorptive capacity tend to make more CVC 
                                                 
5
 A central prediction of real options theory is that the greater the ex-ante uncertainty or variation of 
expected future payoffs, the greater the value of the initial option investment, because the option value is 
realized through the resolution of uncertainty (Ziedonis, 2007). 
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investments. My prediction, however, extends rather than contradicts their work because 
it focuses on how absorptive capacity impacts a firm’s choice of CVC investment relative 
to acquisitions or licensing.  
Next, I consider how internal productivity influences a firm’s choice between 
Acq./Lic. and CVC. A firm experiencing declining internal productivity may need to 
choose Acq./Lic. over CVC because it has an immediate technological need. Existing 
technologies which can be obtained via acquisition or license will be more effective than 
nascent technologies in improving current productivity (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). A 
firm with robust internal productivity, in contrast, may have the ability to focus on 
nurturing nascent technologies which could be used to enhance future productivity; thus, 
it is more likely to choose CVC rather than Acq./Lic..  
Firms have constrained R&D budgets that get split between internal and external 
research efforts. Funds flowing to external R&D efforts can ebb and flow between 
investments, depending on the current needs of the firm. For example, a firm with strong 
internal productivity can shift a greater portion of its external activity to CVC relative to 
licensing or acquisitions. This shift or focus on future technology partners and future 
productivity increases    and thereby decreases (     ). In contrast, a firm 
experiencing declining internal productivity is more likely to engage in acquisition or 
licensing to fulfill immediate technological needs, shifting funds away from CVC 
investments. This focus on current productivity needs increases   , which increases 
(     ). As such, conditional on choosing Internal and External R&D, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2b. Firms experiencing high internal productivity are more likely to 
make CVC investments, relative to engaging in acquisition or licensing.   
 
Stage 3: Technological diversification 
At the third stage firms again face two options. They can integrate the portfolio 
firm technology either through a license or acquisition (Post CVC Acq./Lic.) or they can 
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continue to maintain the firm in their portfolio (Other). The choice between the two for 
the corporate investor can be understood in terms of the exercise, or not, of a real option. 
For us, this exercise choice is dependent upon a firm’s intention or desire to diversify its 
technologies. This theoretical expansion complements the existing literature (Dushnitsky 
and Shaver, 2009) that analyzes the impact of technological relatedness on the formation 
of a CVC tie. 
From my perspective, corporate investors that invest in more technologically 
diversified fields can increase the probability of engaging in subsequent acquisition or 
licensing (Post CVC Acq./Lic.). This occurs because CVC investments give corporate 
investors access to a greater range of technological fields, which potentially increases 
outcomes on the upside, while limiting exposure on the downside. With the passage of 
time, corporate investors obtain additional information about portfolio companies, 
thereby reducing associated uncertainty. Moreover, they can truncate the left-hand tail of 
a performance distribution by more effectively choosing not to engage in a subsequent 
acquisition or license (Post CVC Acq./Lic.). This creates a performance distribution curve 
that is skewed to the right, yielding asymmetric pay-offs (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). In 
other words, corporate investors that invest in technologically diversified fields increase 
the probability of choosing Post CVC Acq./Lic. because more can be learned at a fixed 
cost thereby increasing the relative payoffs from acquiring technology post-CVC either 
through an acquisition of the portfolio company or a licensing transaction, (     ). 
Corporate investors that invest in technologically undiversified fields, in contrast, 
increase their probability of choosing Other post-CVC, because there is less to be learned 
(Schildt et al., 2005; Sapienza et al., 2004), thus decreasing (     ).  
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Note that, contrary to my prediction, it can be argued that corporate investors that 
invest in technologically undiversified fields would be more likely to choose Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. because similar knowledge bases can increase the “marginal rate of learning”. 
This approach seems reasonable in the context of other types of external R&D activity 
(e.g., Lee and Lieberman, 2010; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), but less so in the 
context of CVC investments. CVC investments are by their very nature exploratory rather 
than exploitative initiatives and typically provide an entry mechanism into 
technologically unrelated markets (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005b; Basu et al., 2011). With the passage of time the CVC portfolio firms will continue 
to mature, asymmetric information will diminish and the underlying technological 
distance between them may also decline. Hence, I formulate the following 
Hypothesis 3. Firms making CVC investments in technologically diversified fields 
are more likely to engage in subsequent acquisition or licensing, relative to not 
engaging in subsequent acquisition or licensing.   
 
The expected impacts of my focal variables on the relative payoffs at various stages are 
summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Impact of the variables of interest 
 
 (     ): 
Payoff from Internal 
R&D only relative to 
Internal and External 
R&D 
(     )  
Payoff from Acq./Lic. 
relative to CVC 
(conditional on Internal 
and External R&D) 
(     )  
Payoff from Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. relative to 
Other 
(conditional on CVC) 
Absorptive capacity  +  
Internal productivity    
Technological diversity   + 
 
2.3 Empirical Specification and Data 
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2.3.1 Empirical Specification 
I provide a variety of empirical tests for my theory, including preliminary 
evidence based on two-sample means test, the use of my benchmark specification based 
on the sequential logit model, and other robustness tests that include the use of a 
multinomial logit model and a test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption on which the multinomial logit is based.  
As outlined in the previous section, as a benchmark model I use a three-stage 
sequential model with a hierarchical structure of sequential decisions. In particular, I 
assume that each choice at each stage is made according to a dichotomous logit model 
using the sample that is “at risk”.  The choice probabilities corresponding to equations 
(1.1) to (1. 6) can be estimated, setting relative payoffs as functions of observed firm, 
industry, and choice specific characteristics. In particular, the probability of Internal and 
External R&D (Stage 1), is defined as 
  (                         )    (    )   (         ), (2.1) 
where   represents the binomial logit function.    is a vector of observable characteristics 
of firm  ,    is a vector of attributes at Stage 1,    and    are parameter vectors to be 
estimated.  
The probability of choosing CVC conditional on Internal and External R&D 
(Stage 2) is 
  (                             )    (          )
  (         ) 
(2.2) 
where    is a vector of attributes at Stage 2, and    and    are parameter vectors. 
The probability of choosing Other conditional on Internal and External R&D 
and CVC (Stage 3) is 
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  (                                   )    (         )
  (         ) 
(2.3) 
where    is a vector of attributes at Stage 3 and    and    are parameter vectors to be 
estimated. The most direct method of estimating the parameter vectors,   , ...,   , is to 
proceed to the successive estimation of logit models with a smaller number of responses 
using maximum likelihood. I therefore estimate equation (2.1) first, with a simple logit, 
with all observations in the sample; I then estimate (2.2) using a logit model with all 
observations for which     ; and finally I estimate (2.3), again with a simple logit 
model, with all observations for which      . 
2.3.2 Data 
My dataset is based on 1,210 observations, corresponding to the internal and 
external R&D activities of 59 unique pharmaceutical firms during the years between 
1985 and 2007, a period of great expansion in external R&D activities in this industry 
(Ceccagnoli and Higgins, 2011; MacMillan et al., 2008).
6
 My primary data source is the 
Deloitte Recap database (www.recap.com), which tracks the entire lifecycle of portfolio 
companies making CVC investments in the biopharmaceutical industry, from founding 
through all rounds of financing to final disposition. As a result I am able to identify the 
time of investment and any subsequent investments, licenses or acquisitions involving the 
CVC investing firms.  
For each of my corporate investors (pharmaceutical firms) I also reconstruct their 
drug pipeline using data from PharmaProjects. This data contains the history and 
                                                 
6
 I limit my analysis to this period for two reasons. First, the beginning of the sample, 1985, represents the 
first year following the passage of Hatch-Waxman, which established the current regulatory regime for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Second, I lack pipeline information for the post-2007 period, as further discussed 
below. 
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progress of more than 36,500 drugs that have been developed since 1980. Next, I utilize 
patent data from the NBER to construct patent stocks for each investor and external 
partner, to build a measure of technological diversity. Finally, financial data is collected 
from Compustat and scientific publication data is gathered from Web of Science. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for my variables are reported in Table 2.3. All 




Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Mean and standard deviation 
 
All sample                     
Variable Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
1. Choice (yi) 1.01 0.91 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 
2. Absorptive capacity 1.28 1.96 0.37 0.83 1.74 2.31 1.47 1.80 1.43 1.65 
3. Internal productivity 5.89 9.92 1.45 3.71 7.36 10.86 8.90 12.35 8.68 10.94 
4. Technological diversity 0.96 0.11 0.97 0.11 0.96 0.11 0.96 0.06 0.94 0.10 
5. Firm size 12.00 17.60 6.99 15.52 15.07 19.33 11.33 13.81 11.41 13.21 
6. Financial slack 4.84 8.72 2.38 5.25 6.19 10.36 4.92 6.54 4.98 7.66 
7. Prior alliance intensity 361.19 2732.18 698.97 3694.89 271.82 2561.06 55.58 168.49 95.51 372.33 
8. Investor’s technological capability 370.22 1107.26 282.42 1163.35 437.93 1188.59 213.31 324.80 390.99 861.29 
9. Research-intensive firm’s technological capability 30.97 85.66 3.35 13.34 40.77 92.24 43.62 110.46 49.43 120.88 
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Dependent variable: Choice of R&D activity. 
My discrete dependent variable, Choice, is null when a corporate investor 
(pharmaceutical firm) reports positive R&D investments in any given year (information 
collected from Compustat) but does not engage in any external R&D activity as reported 
by Deloitte Recap in that year (    ). Choice is greater than zero when an investor 
reports positive R&D investments in a given year and engages in either: 1) an acquisition 
or a license (as a buyer) in that year without a prior CVC investment in the target (or 
partner) firm (    ); 2) a CVC investment with subsequent acquisition or license with 
the target (or partner) firm (    ); 3) a CVC investment without any subsequent 
acquisition or license (    ). Table 2.4 presents the distribution of this choice variable 
over time. 
Table 2.4. Distribution of R&D choice variable through time 




(    ) 
 
Acq./Lic. 
(    ) 
Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. 
(    ) 
Other 




(    ) 
CVC 
(    ) 
1985 16 4 2 1 7 3 
1986 14 9 0 1 10 1 
1987 13 11 2 0 13 2 
1988 15 11 1 3 15 4 
1989 19 7 1 2 10 3 
1990 18 16 1 4 21 5 
1991 20 19 3 3 25 6 
1992 24 14 8 11 33 19 
1993 20 18 2 9 29 11 
1994 20 22 9 10 41 19 
1995 15 30 7 11 48 18 
1996 10 35 11 15 61 26 
1997 12 37 6 13 56 19 
1998 13 42 10 6 58 16 
1999 12 40 11 9 60 20 
2000 11 37 6 6 49 12 
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Table 2.4. continued 
 
2001 10 44 4 12 60 16 
2002 10 41 4 9 54 13 
2003 13 40 0 8 48 8 
2004 14 40 0 6 46 6 
2005 19 38 0 1 39 1 
2006 19 36 0 0 36 0 
2007 19 34 1 0 35 1 
1985-1989 77 42 6 7 55 13 
1990-1999 164 273 68 91 432 159 
2000-2007 115 310 15 42 367 57 
Total 356 625 89 140 854 229 
Notes. This table reports R&D decisions regarding internal R&D and external technology acquisition 
activities by year.  The first four columns tabulate my discrete dependent variable    {       }  by year.  
While      denote Internal and External R&D,      denotes CVC (with or without a subsequent 
acquisition or licensing) at the second stage.  
 
Independent variables 
Absorptive capacity. Several different measures of absorptive capacity have been 
proposed in the literature. The most widely used, partly due to its availability for public 
companies, is R&D intensity. This is also the measure used by Cohen and Levinthal in 
their pioneering work on this topic (1989, 1990). Arora and Gambardella (1994) argue 
that a firm’s basic research capabilities are particularly effective in capturing a firm’s 
ability to evaluate and select external knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994), which 
is a critical capability in the context of CVC investments. Measures of upstream research 
capabilities have been shown to be key drivers of the potential complementarity between 
a firm’s internal and external R&D activities (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). In 
particular, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) use responses on the importance, for the 
innovation process, of information from research institutes and universities as reflecting a 
firm’s absorptive capacity. Along these lines, scholars have measured a firm’s ability to 
select and evaluate external knowledge using a firm’s human capital, including the 
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number of a firm’s R&D employees with a doctorate degree (Veugelers, 1997) or the 
number of scientific publications of a firm’s employees (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; 
Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). Following the literature, and considering data 
availability, I therefore use the number of scientific papers published by firm employees 
(scaled by one hundred) to estimate absorptive capacity. 
Internal productivity. Since I analyze an industry whose revenue stream is 
dependent upon new products, I use drug pipeline data to measure internal productivity. 
First, I create counts of the number of drugs in each stage of development (preclinical, 
Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3). This raw count is biased towards earlier-stage products, given 
their larger relative number. As such, I multiply the number of drugs in each stage of 
development by a transition probability that broadly approximates the chance of 
receiving FDA approval (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Unlike a raw count this measure 
places more weight on later-stage products. Prior research has demonstrated that shocks 
or gaps in the later-stage pipeline will cause companies to enter the external technology 
markets (e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Chan et al. 2007; Danzon et al., 2007).  
Technological diversity. I estimate technological diversity, which is inversely 
related to technological proximity, between corporate (pharmaceutical) investors and 
portfolio (biotechnology) firms using the 3-digit patent classification listed on each firm’s 
patents (e.g., Jaffe, 1986; Ahuja, 2000). Using these patent classes, I compute the number 
of patents that share the 3-digit patent class between corporate investors and portfolio 
firms. This number is then divided by the stock of the corporate investor’s successful 
patent applications and depreciated by 15% annually (Hall et al., 2005) and subtracted 
from one. Measures computed on samples with few patents or those limited to a single 
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patent class can generate both biased and imprecise measures of proximity (Benner and 
Waldfogel, 2008). In order to avoid this potential pitfall I use all patent applications by 
the biotechnology (portfolio) firms.  
Control variables 
Firm size. Firm size can impact a firm’s decision on R&D activities. While larger 
firms can benefit from economies of scale and scope (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996), 
smaller firms are often more nimble and can make faster decisions on R&D activities 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1987). Thus, I measure firm size by their total assets.  
Financial slack. Financial slack, which is defined as the availability of funds in 
order to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities, can also impact a firm’s 
decision on R&D activities. The pecking order theory of finance suggests that firms tend 
to use internally generated funds in the form of retained earnings before turning to 
external sources because the external costs of monitoring and risk of asymmetric 
information are substantial (Myers, 1984). As such, I follow Geiger and Cashen (2002) 
and estimate financial slack using retained earnings.   
Prior alliance intensity. Firms previously engaged in alliances are likely to 
continue to enter new alliances because of their path-dependent nature and learning 
effects on R&D activities (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). I estimate a firm’s prior 
alliance intensity by calculating their stock of previous alliances normalized by their real 
total assets. CVC investments, acquisitions, and licenses are excluded from this measure. 
Corporate investor’s technological capability. Prior research has demonstrated a 
relationship between the technological capabilities of a firm and its R&D activities 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1994). I control for the technological capability of my corporate 
 31 
investors by their stock of successful patent applications, depreciated by 15% annually 
(Hall et al., 2005).  
Research intensive firm’s technological capability. Research-intensive 
(biotechnology) firms’ technological capabilities can also impact corporate investors’ 
R&D activity decisions (Ziedonis, 2007). Similar to my previous measure, I estimate the 
research-intensive firms’ technological capabilities by calculating their stock of 
successful patent applications, depreciated by 15% annually (Hall et al., 2005).  
Therapeutic category and year fixed effects.  In some of the empirical 
specifications I include therapeutic fixed effects using the Anatomical Therapeutic 
Classification (ATC) defined by the World Health Organization (http://www.who.int). 
For my purposes, I used ten dummy variables corresponding to the first-level of the ATC. 
I also include time dummies corresponding to the year of the reported R&D activity 
during the 1985-2007 study period. 
2.4 Empirical Findings 
2.4.1 Nonparametric Statistics 
Table 2.5 reports two-sample mean tests comparing my variables of interest 
across a pharmaceutical firm’s R&D activity decision. Note that consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, Panel A demonstrates that the mean of Absorptive capacity is significantly 
greater for the firms that choose Internal and External R&D over the firms that choose 
Internal R&D only. Panel B demonstrates that the mean of Absorptive capacity is 
significantly greater for the firms that choose Acq./Lic. versus the firms that choose CVC, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2a. Panel B also demonstrates that the mean of Internal 
productivity is significantly greater for firms that choose CVC compared to those that 
 32 
choose Acq./Lic., consistent with Hypothesis 2b. Finally, Panel C demonstrates that the 
mean of Technological diversity is significantly greater for firms that choose Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. compared to those that choose Other, consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
Collectively, these results provide some non-parametric statistics suggesting that my data 
are broadly consistent with my theoretical predictions.  
Table 2.5. Hypotheses test using the two-group means test 
 
Panel A: First stage choices 









N 356 854     
 
Panel B: Second stage choices 
 








N 625 229     









N 625 229     
     
Panel C: Third stage choices 








N 61 101     
Notes. This table reports two-group means tests that compare the means of the variables of interest by the 
firms’ R&D decisions by stages, as represented in Figure 2.1. I estimate the following t-statistics:   
 ( ̅   ̅ )  (     )   (  
    )  (  
    ) 
   , where  ̅  and  ̅  are two group means with normal 
populations of size    and   , unknown means    and   , and unknown standard deviations    and   . 






 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
2.4.2 Benchmark Model: Sequential Logit  
My benchmark results are presented in Table 2.6. I present specifications without 
(Models 1, 2, 3) and with (Models 4, 5, 6) therapeutic categories and year fixed-effects. 
The Pseudo (McFadden) R-squares suggest that models with therapeutic categories and 
year fixed-effects (Models 4, 5, 6) fit the data substantially better. As such, I will focus 
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my comments on these models (Models 4, 5, 6), noting that results from Models (1, 2, 3) 
are qualitatively similar.  
With reference to and consistent with Hypothesis 1, the findings suggest that 
Absorptive capacity has a positive and significant effect on the probability of choosing 
Internal and External R&D at the first transition (or stage). The effect is large, since the 
elasticity, not reported in the table, suggests that a 1% increase in the number of 
publications of the focal firm leads to a 6% increase in the probability of choosing 
Internal and External R&D at the first transition (or stage), with the effect statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level.  
The effect of Absorptive capacity is reversed at the second stage. Indeed, I find 
that Absorptive capacity has a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
making a CVC investment conditional on Internal and External R&D (second transition). 
The elasticity, not reported, suggests that a 1% increase in the number of publications 
leads to a 6% decrease in the probability of CVC conditional on Internal and External 
R&D, with the elasticity statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This 
suggests that conditional on both Internal and External R&D, firms possessing high 
Absorptive capacity tend to choose Acq./Lic. rather than CVC, supporting Hypothesis 2a. 
At the second stage of the decision tree depicted in Figure 2.1, and consistent 
with my prediction made in Hypothesis 2b, the findings show that Internal productivity 
has a positive and significant effect, conditional on Internal and External R&D, on the 
probability of choosing CVC rather than Acq./Lic. The estimated elasticity, not reported 
in the table, suggests that a 1% increase in the number of drugs in the pipeline leads to a 
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6% increase in the probability of making a CVC investment conditional on Internal and 
External R&D, with the elasticity statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find that Technological diversity has a 
significant and negative effect on the probability of choosing Other at the third transition. 
This implies that a corporate investor (pharmaceutical firms), conditional on engaging in 
both Internal and External R&D and making CVC investments in technologically 
diversified fields, is more likely to choose Post CVC Acq./Lic., e.g. to strengthen its 
relationship with the portfolio firm through a license or acquisition post-CVC investment. 
The size of this effect is rather large, since the estimates imply that a 1% increase in my 
measure of Technological diversity leads to a 76% increase in the probability of making a 
license or acquisition with a portfolio firm conditional on Internal and External R&D and 
a CVC investment.   
Table 2.6. Benchmark results: Sequential logit 
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(0.2858) (0.0944) (0.1230) (0.4506) (0.0992) (0.2019) 











(0.0470) (0.0171) (0.0224) (0.0505) (0.0243) (0.0278) 




  0.2840 -4.3288
*
 
 (1.3412) (1.8584)  (1.2518) (2.5800) 






 0.0095 -0.0364 0.0074 
(0.0376) (0.0182) (0.0170) (0.0320) (0.0261) (0.0274) 
       
Financial slack -0.0034 0.0267 -0.0196 0.0220 0.0248 0.0277 
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Table 2.6. continued 
 
 (0.0815) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0754) (0.0412) (0.0493) 
       
Prior alliance intensity 
-0.0000 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0019
*
 
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0010) 





 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0017
***
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
       
Research-intensive firm’s 
technological capability 





 (0.0011) (0.0005)  (0.0009) (0.0011) 




 -0.8138 -0.9730 4.5132
*
 
(0.1958) (1.2627) (1.6064) (0.5367) (1.3957) (2.3396) 
       
ATC specific effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 1210 519 162 1210 506 158 
Log likelihood -6.1e+02 -3.1e+02 -1.0e+02 -5.6e+02 -2.7e+02 -86.5447 
Prob>χ
2
 0.0033 0.2013 0.0823 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
pseudo R
2
 0.170 0.032 0.060 0.237 0.136 0.162 






 denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
 
2.4.3 Robustness Checks 
I test the sensitivity of my results to the hypothesized structure of the decision tree 
outlined in Figure 2.1. In particular, note that in my final dataset, I can only exploit 158 
CVC transactions to identify the effect of about 20 covariates (in the benchmark model 
with ATC and year effects) on the focal firms’ decision to engage in Post CVC Acq./Lic. 
conditional on Internal and External R&D and CVC. As a robustness check, I consider a 
simpler two-stage model, shown in Figure 2.2, obtained by collapsing the second and 
third levels of my benchmark three-stage decision process. In this case, conditional on 
Internal and External R&D (in the second stage) focal firms face the mutually exclusive 
options of Acq./Lic., Post CVC Acq./Lic., or Other. I estimate this model in two stages. 
First stage estimation and results are identical to the first stage sequential logit results, in 
which I use the full sample to estimate the probability that a firm engages in Internal and 
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External R&D based on a simple logit model (these are presented in the columns related 
to the first transition in Table 2.6).  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Sensitivity analysis: A two stage sequential decision model 
 
In the second stage, I instead use a multinomial logit model using the external 
R&D activities of firms that engage in Internal and External R&D. These estimates are 
presented in Table 2.7. I only show estimates obtained controlling for both ATC and year 
fixed effects, since these are jointly significant and provide substantially better fit (as 
measured by the McFadden “pseudo” R-square). In Model 1 I normalize the payoffs of 
the second stage depicted in Figure 2.2 by the payoffs from Acq./Lic.( ̃ ), e.g. the base 
group of the multinomial logit is (    ). As such, Model 1 estimates provide 
information about the impact of covariates on the payoffs from choosing Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. (    ) or Other (    ) relative to choosing Acq./Lic.. In Model 2 payoffs 
from second-stage choices are normalized by the payoffs from Post CVC Acq./Lic. ( ̃ ), 
e.g. the base group of the multinomial logit is (    ).  
The negative coefficients on Absorptive capacity in Model (1) provide additional 
support for my prediction made in Hypothesis 2a. They suggest that Absorptive capacity 
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decreases both the payoffs from Post CVC Acq./Lic. and Other relative to Acq./Lic.. The 
joint effect of the two coefficients (not shown) is significant at the 1% significance level.   
I also find further support for Hypothesis 2b, since Internal productivity increases 
both payoffs from Post CVC Acq./Lic. and Other relative to Acq./Lic., and the joint effect 
(not shown) is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This model, in particular the third column of Table 2.7, also shows that the 
coefficient on Technological diversity is negative and significant at the 10% significance 
level, suggesting that the payoffs from Post CVC Acq./Lic. relative to keeping the 
minority equity investment or liquidating it (Other) are higher when investor and 
portfolio firms are technologically diverse. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
Table 2.7. Two-stage model: Multinomial logit results for second stage choice 
 
Model (1) (2) 
Base group 
Acq./Lic. conditional on 
Int. & Ext. R&D 
(    ) 
Post CVC Acq./Lic. 
conditional on Int. 
& Ext. R&D 
(    ) 
Choice of R&D  
(  ) 
Post CVC Acq./Lic. 
conditional on Int. 
& Ext. R&D 
 (         ) 
Other 
conditional on Int. 
& Ext. R&D 
(         ) 
Other 
conditional on Int. 
& Ext. R&D 
(         ) 
    
Absorptive capacity -0.2457 -0.4040*** -0.1583 
(0.1613) (0.1187) (0.2055) 
Internal productivity 0.0433 0.0910*** 0.0476 
(0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0310) 
Technological diversity 1.7889 -0.4798 -2.2687* 
(1.5098) (1.2487) (1.3039) 
Firm size -0.0605* -0.0336 0.0268 
(0.0349) (0.0272) (0.0305) 
Financial slack 0.0651 0.0112 -0.0539 
(0.0652) (0.0427) (0.0636) 
Prior alliance intensity -0.0008* 0.0001 0.0010* 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Investor’s technological 
capability 
-0.0006 0.0006 0.0012* 
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Research-intensive firm’s 
technological capability 
0.0008 0.0023** 0.0015 
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
Constant -3.7854** -2.6803* 1.1051 
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Table 2.7. continued 
 
 (1.6388) (1.5401) (1.7496) 
    
ATC specific effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
N=519   
Log likelihood=-366.033     
pseudo R
2
=0.148   
Notes. The first stage estimates of the two-stage model outlined in Figure 2.2 are identical to the 
first transition (stage) estimates of the three-stage model presented in Table 2.6 and summarized in 






 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Last, I checked the sensitivity of the multinomial logit results to the potential 
violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. Lack of 
independence of the error terms across choices would lead to wrong inferences on the 
effect of the examined variables on the relative attractiveness of different alternatives, 
because such inferences would critically depend on the alternatives under consideration. 
A robust way to test the sensitivity of the results to violation of the IIA property is to 
estimate the model on the sample obtained excluding a subset of choices. Since I consider 
three alternatives in the second stage of Figure 2.2, this amounts to estimating a series of 
logit models. The results, presented in Table 2.8, suggest that the effect of the covariates 
on the relative payoff of each choice remains unchanged. The Wald tests of the difference 
between the coefficient estimated with the full multinomial logit model for all three 
alternatives and those obtained from the restricted multinomial models in which one 
alternative is in turn excluded cannot reject the null hypothesis that these coefficients are 
equal, as evidenced by the p-values of the Wald test indicated in Table 8.
7
 
Table 2.8. Testing the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption 
 
                                                 
7
 Full and restricted models are jointly estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression model. 
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Payoffs from Other 
relative to Acq./Lic. 
Payoffs from Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. relative to 
Acq./Lic. 
Payoffs from Other 
relative to Post CVC 
Acq./Lic. 
Main variables 
(Post CVC Acq./Lic. is 
excluded) 




























  (0.108) 
 
 (0.141)  (0.178)  











  (0.026) 
 
 (0.027)  (0.036) 
 
 











  (0.893)  (1.050)  (3.114) 
 
 
             
All 23 covariates, including 
ATC and year fixed effects 
  0.851    0.917    0.719  













Notes. All estimates are obtained conditional on firms engaging in Internal and External R&D, e.g. are 
based on the second stage of the decision tree outlined in Figure 2.2. I then test the sensitivity of the results 
to violation of the IIA property by estimating a series of logit models obtained by excluding a subset of 
choices. The reported Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient from the corresponding 
logit is equal to the corresponding coefficient using multinomial logit, whereby both models are jointly 
estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression model. Failure to reject suggests that results are not 







: Significantly different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. 
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study I present a perspective in which CVC investments can be used as an 
ex-ante evaluation mechanism which helps corporate investors effectively search for and 
select future technology partners. In summary, and consistent with this framework, I find 
that CVC investments are complementary to licensing and acquisitions, since they 
facilitate future transactions. In particular, my results suggest that CVC investments 
facilitate the external acquisition of technology by substituting for a firm’s absorptive 
capacity, as reflected by its upstream research capabilities. CVC investments instead 
complement the portfolio of internally generated new products, since they allow highly 
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productive firms to shift their focus onto exploratory initiatives whose objective is to 
select future technology and partners. Finally, CVC investments facilitate exploratory 
investments in distant technological areas that are subsequently integrated through 
licensing or acquisitions. 
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to an 
emerging research on the organization and financing patterns of external R&D activities 
(e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Mathews, 2006; Robinson, 2008; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 
2009). This study, unlike the extant literature which has focused on a single type of 
external R&D activity, suggests that CVC investments should be considered in 
conjunction with other types of external R&D activity. This approach, I believe, is more 
appropriate because firms often pursue an R&D strategy which is comprised of several 
types of external R&D activity simultaneously. 
Second, this study also contributes to the literature on optimal organization and 
financing arrangements between corporate investors and start-ups (e.g., Hellmann, 2002; 
Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Unlike that literature, however, which 
has investigated how resource constraints and appropriation problems affect CVC 
investments, my study suggests that CVC investments can be greatly determined by 
timing, which ultimately affects the level of asymmetric information and uncertainty 
found in the market for technology.  
Finally, this study is particularly important for the pharmaceutical industry, which 
has faced severe productivity challenges in the last decade and where significant levels of 
uncertainty and adverse selection problems are common (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 
and 1994). As a result, effective decisions on external R&D activity are critical in 
generating profits for growth (e.g., Nicholson et al., 2005; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; 
Ceccagnoli and Higgins, 2011). My findings imply that several types of external R&D 
activity co-exist, each fulfilling their own strategic role in this industry. This is also 
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consistent with prior work which suggests that the external strategies of large 
pharmaceutical firms, which include alliances, as well as majority and minority equity 
investments in smaller biotechnology companies, are complementary since they are 
positively correlated (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). From this point of view, I extend 
this literature by providing evidence on the sources of such complementarities.   
This study has also important implications for managers. In particular, it implies 
that managers should consider the timing issue of each type of external R&D activity to 
maximize firm productivity. This implication is particularly important in the 
pharmaceutical industry, which has a long product development cycle. This study also 
implies that I need to better understand how various types of external R&D activities 
affect one another. My findings suggest that one type of external R&D activity cannot be 
used independently from other types of activities; a consolidated perspective on the 
various types of external R&D activities is needed. 
Finally, my focus on the pharmaceutical industry suggests that my findings need 
to be interpreted carefully in the context of other industries. This notion is important 
because each industry has its own technological and managerial environment (e.g., 
development cycles are very different across industries) and uses CVC investments 










COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES? TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVERS AND CAPITAL GAINS CREATED BY CORPORATE 
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Unlike independent venture capitalists that primarily pursue financial returns, 
corporate investors benefit from technological as well as financial returns from their 
investments.
8
 The technological benefits come from exposure and access to external 
technologies and products, while the financial return can come through the selling of 
stocks in an IPO, acquisitions of portfolios by third-parties, or other types of liquidation 
events. An example is the investment by the corporate venture capital (CVC) arm of Eli 
Lilly and Company in Millennium Pharmaceuticals Inc., in 1995. Eli Lilly received 
technological benefits from the collaborative research efforts into the genetic causes of 
atherosclerosis and congestive heart failure – it also received a substantial financial gain 
from the IPO of Millennium Pharmaceuticals in 1996. 
 It is well recognized that technological returns are important in CVC investments 
though reliable measures are hard to obtain because of the difficulty in isolating and 
estimating these returns. As a result, we know little about the nature of interaction, if it 
exists, between the technological and financial returns from CVC investments. I believe 
                                                 
8
 These two types of return have been respectively discussed in the existing literature. Technological return 
created by CVC investments has been analyzed in Gompers and Lerner (1998), Anand and Galetovic 
(2000), Chesbrough (2002), Hellmann (2002), Maula and Murray (2002), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a, 
2005b, and 2006), Wadhwa and Kotha (2006), Katila et al. (2008), Keil et al. (2008), Benson and Ziedonis 
(2008), Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009), and Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009). Financial return created by CVC 
investments has been investigated in Sykes (1986), Gompers and Lerner (1998), Maula and Murray (2002), 
Henderson and Leleux (2003), Allen and Hevert (2007), and Benson and Ziedonis (2010). Moreover, 
several surveys have reported that corporate investors make CVC investments to pursue these two types of 
return (e.g., Siegel et al., 1988; Corporate Strategic Board, 2000; Kann, 2000; Asset Alternatives, 2002; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006; MacMillan et al., 2008). 
 43 
that an understanding of this interaction is important because it sheds light on the motives 
of corporate investors and on whether CVC investments ultimately create a positive total 
return for corporate investors. Moreover, to the extent that financial return is largely a 
reflection of the changes in the market values of portfolios, the nature of the interaction 
indicates whether or not CVC investments create mutual benefits between corporate 
investors and portfolios. Such a mutuality of benefits may well play a key role in 
determining the success or failure of CVC investments. 
Beyond just the nature of the interaction, my understanding of contextual factors 
impacting the interaction is important because it can help corporate investors balance 
technological and financial returns (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 2004) and thus increase 
the total return created by CVC investments. For example, consider if technological and 
financial returns are indeed complements and the complementarity is affected by 
investment- or firm-specific factors. In this case, corporate investors should be taking 
advantage of these contextual factors to maximize their total return. Since corporate 
investors can be reasonably assumed to want to maximize their total return, 
understanding the conditions under which technological and financial returns are 
complements is more practical and important than merely identifying the existence of 
complementarity. In addition, these contextual factors can be understood to facilitate the 
mutual benefits between corporate investors and portfolios. Hence, in my paper I will 
pursue two interrelated questions: (1) Are technological and financial returns created by 
CVC investments complements, substitutes, or independent?  (2) What contextual factors 
impact the interaction between technological and financial returns? 
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To address these questions, I develop a simple and flexible model that analyzes 
the nature of the relationship between technological and financial returns and gives rise to 
testable implications. By evaluating the technological and financial returns created by 71 
bio-pharmaceutical corporate investors between 1985 and 2005, I present novel and 
systematic evidence that supports the existence of complementarity between these two 
types of return. Moreover, consistent with the predictions, my findings suggest that this 
complementarity is enhanced when CVC investments are made in post-IPO and 
technologically diversified portfolios, respectively.      
My study contributes to different strands of the literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature on CVC investments by providing systematic estimates of technological and 
financial returns and the nature of their relationship. To the best of my knowledge, this 
study is the first to systematically estimate both technological and financial returns. Thus, 
my study extends the prior studies in the literature that have focused on either one of the 
two types of return and thus helps better evaluate the costs and benefits of CVC 
investments.       
Second, and more broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on the way in 
which firms organize and finance their R&D investments. While one perspective suggests 
that active pursuit of financial return can come at the cost of technological return (e.g., 
Rind, 1981; Chesbrough, 2002; Gompers and Lerner, 2004), an alternative perspective is 
that corporate investors can pursue technological and financial returns simultaneously. 
My findings are consistent with the latter perspective. Thus, corporate investors can use 
CVC investments as a strategy to facilitate their external R&D activities at a lower cost. 
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Finally, my paper develops and tests hypotheses about the conditions under which 
portfolios would be expected to capture a larger share of the value created in CVC 
investments and the possible impact on financial and technological returns and their 
complementarity. I argue that the complementarity can reflect, in part, the existence of 
mutual benefits between corporate investors and, hence, conditions under which 
portfolios are being provided stronger incentives. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents my analytical 
framework and hypotheses. The subsequent section describes my empirical strategy and 
data. I then report empirical results and conclude.  
3.2 Model and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Related Literature 
The existing literature on technological return created by CVC investments is 
often related to technology spillovers or transfers that originate from portfolios (Anand 
and Galetovic, 2000; Hellmann, 2002). For example, pharmaceutical firms that get 
locked into specific research programs often make CVC investments primarily to learn 
about, license, and acquire innovative technologies pursued by biotech firms (Ceccagnoli 
and Higgins, 2011). These CVC investments can take the form of pure equity 
investments or equity plus additional rights such as licensing and collaboration 
agreements in the development, marketing, and sales of products (Hamermesh et al., 
2007). As a result, corporate investors can obtain several types of technological return: 
innovative ideas (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a and 2005b; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; 
Keil et al., 2008), a window into future technology (Siegel et al., 1988; Yost and Devlin, 
1993; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Alter and Buchsbaum, 2002; Benson and Ziedonis, 
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2008), a capacity to select future technology partners (Folta, 1998; Van De Vrande et al., 
2006; Van De Vrande and Vanhaverbeke, 2009; Li and Mahoney, 2011), and market 
penetration (Maula and Murray, 2002; Lipuma, 2007). Considering this wide range of 
technological returns created by CVC investments, I define technological return in a 
fairly comprehensive way as the change in corporate investors’ research productivity that 
results from the new knowledge, processes, and products from CVC investments.    
The existing literature on technological return investigates the conditions under 
which corporate investors can source external technology pursued by portfolios. For 
example, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a and 2005b) argue that firms make more CVC 
investments in industries with weak intellectual property protection because technology 
spillovers can easily occur in such industries. Wadhwa and Kotha (2006) and Keil et al. 
(2008) find evidence that corporate investors’ technological performance hinges on their 
technological diversity and relatedness to portfolios. Katila et al. (2008) and Dushnitsky 
and Shaver (2009) find that, under a regime of weak intellectual property protection, 
fewer CVC investments are made when portfolios target the same industry as corporate 
investors. A limitation of many of these studies is that indirect evidence is used to infer 
the technological progress from CVC investments. I believe that my paper contributes to 
the literature by attempting to isolate and estimate the technological return created by 
CVC investments in a specific context. 
Another strand of the literature offers a real options view that CVC investments 
represent an option to proceed or defer subsequent external R&D activities (e.g., Folta, 
1998; Van De Vrande et al., 2006; Van De Vrande and Vanhaverbeke, 2009; Li and 
Mahoney, 2011). The notion is that corporate investors can use the new information 
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obtained from CVC investments to decide on future R&D activities. For example, Folta 
(1998) finds that CVC investments economize on the cost of committing resources to the 
technology with an uncertain value in domains in which learning about growth 
opportunities dominates investment activities. Van De Vrande et al. (2006) suggest that 
firms can be better off using CVC investments that are reversible and involve a low level 
of commitment in the early stage of technology development.  
Although technological return has been the focus of much of the literature on 
CVC investments, surveys find that financial return is also regarded as an important 
motive in making CVC investments. For example, MacMillan et al. (2008) report that 
fifty percent of their sample CVC programs invest primarily for technological return, but 
that financial return is a requirement, while twenty percent of the sample programs invest 
primarily for financial return but technological return is requirement. The remaining 
thirty percent are split equally between pursuing only financial or only technological 
returns. It is argued that the financial return makes it possible to maintain CVC programs 
(Hardymon et al., 1983; Siegel et al., 1988; Gompers and Lerner, 2004). The paucity of 
available data on the financial return from individual CVC investments makes it hard to 
definitively ascertain whether or not CVC investments ultimately create positive financial 
return (Allen and Hevert, 2007). 
Evidence on financial return is often limited to case studies (e.g., Sykes, 1986; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Chesbrough, 2002) or comparisons of the IPO performances 
of portfolios financed by corporate investors and independent venture capitalists (e.g., 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Maula and Murray, 2002; Henderson and Leleux, 2003). For 
example, Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that corporate investors fare as well as 
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independent venture capitalists by using the IPO rate of portfolios. Maula and Murray 
(2002) find that portfolios that are financed jointly by corporate investors and 
independent venture capitalists have a higher valuation at IPO than those financed by 
only independent venture capitalists. Henderson and Leleux (2003) find that portfolios 
engaged in prior collaboration with corporate investors are more likely to have an IPO 
than those not financed by corporate investors. Benson and Ziedonis (2010) find that 
portfolios financed by corporate investors tend to show the negative cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) in their acquisitions. Allen and Hevert (2007) find that the distribution of 
financial return is wide and bimodal, with thirty percent of CVC programs achieving 
IRRs greater than forty percent and an equal proportion with returns of negative twenty 
percent or worse.  
There is, however, little theory and empirical evidence to guide us on the nature 
of the interaction between financial and technological returns. To the extent that several 
surveys have repeatedly emphasized the technological and financial returns as important 
motives for CVC investments, this gap in the literature is somewhat surprising.      
3.2.2 Interaction between Technological Spillovers and Capital Gains 
Complementarity is understood to exist if increasing one variable raises the return 
to increasing the other variable.
9
 By the same token, decreasing one variable can raise the 
return to increasing the other variable. This is the case of substitutability. 
                                                 
9
 This definition is used in a set of studies that examine the complementarity of two variables (e.g., 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Athey and Stern, 1998; Persico, 2000; Siggelkow, 2002; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Loskhin et al., 2007). More formally, my definition of complementarity is originated from 
the supermodular function that exhibits complementarities among its arguments. A function         is 
supermodular if  (   )   (   )   ( )   ( ) for all       , where     denotes the 
componentwise maximum and     the componentwise minimum of   and  . This function is equivalent 
to  (   )   (   )   ( )   (   )   ( )   (   ) and  (   )   ( )   ( )   (   ). 
These reformulations make clear the sense in which complementarity exists if the change resulting from 
increasing two arguments together is greater than that resulting from increasing two arguments separately. 
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I set up a simple model to study the nature of interaction between technological 
and financial returns and associated factors that impact the interaction. To begin, suppose 
that a corporate investor decides on the level of its CVC investment, denoted by  . For 
this investment, the corporate investor receives an ownership of a fraction β (of the 
shares) of the portfolio. The fraction β depends on the bargaining power of the corporate 
investor relative to the portfolio and on the need to provide appropriate incentives to the 
portfolio.  
I assume that the corporate investor can obtain two types of technology flows 
from the CVC investment: first, it has the right to purchase/license technology developed 
by the portfolio firm; second, the corporate investor benefits through a positive spillover 
(for which the portfolio is not compensated) effect on its ongoing internal R&D. In the 
former case, the amount paid to the portfolio                Since I have normalized the 
rest of the value of the portfolio to zero, this is also the value (say at IPO or when 
acquired by a third party) of the portfolio. Given the corporate investor’s β fractional 
ownership of the portfolio, its financial return, denoted by    can be expressed as:     
  (    )  .                                                                                                  (1) 
I assume that the amount π that the corporate investor pays may be well below the 
economic value of the technology purchased/licensed from the portfolio. I take this 
economic value to have a form      , where   represents the research productivity 
associated with the CVC investment. The ability of the corporate investor to pay 
significantly less than the economic value can be affected by the relative bargaining 
power of the corporate investor and portfolio as well as the extent to which the 
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technology can be appropriated by the corporate investor. I denote the appropriability of 
the technology and value expropriation by  , such that:  
  (   )     .                                                                                                (2)   
Hence, when the corporate investor finds it more difficult to appropriate the technology 
developed by the portfolio or is in a weaker bargaining position, I can expect   to be 
higher. 
 It is supposed that the positive spillover effect from CVC investments is such that 
the corporate investor can increase its internal R&D productivity by utilizing the 
information or knowledge obtained through the CVC investment. Specifically, I assume 
that the additional number of new technology (e.g., knowledge/innovation) is given by 
     , where   can be understood as the corporate investor’s ability to generate new 
technology from the information or knowledge developed. If the value of each innovative 
product/technology is expected to be  , then the value created by the spillover effect can 
be expressed as       . Thus, from the perspective of the corporate investor, the 
economic value   created by the CVC investment is given by:      
      (   )               ,                                                          (3)   
A corporate investor can maximize the expected economic value of CVC investments by 
choosing to invest at the level of    such that: 
         ( )  (    (   )     ) .                                               (4)  
Note that an increase in the productivity parameter   leads to a higher level of CVC 
investment   and thus increases the financial return as well as the technological return 
(e.g., generation of new technology/innovation/product). It is also noteworthy that a 
decrease in the appropriability parameter   (by typing the financial return F more closely 
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to the overall value produced) tends to increase the correlation between the financial and 
technological returns. Note, however, that the types of CVC investment that produce the 
more value for the corporate investor are those with a greater amount of appropriability – 
and, hence, somewhat lower financial returns. My simple model offers a possible 
perspective on complementarity – that attractive CVC investment opportunities will 
induce more investments and generate financial gains as well as technological gains, 
those for which the portfolio is compensated, as well as those for which it is not. In what 
follows, I discuss the notion of complementarity between financial and technological 
returns more broadly in the context of the existing literature. I will also draw upon the 
model and my discussion of the literature to obtain empirical hypotheses that I 
subsequently test. 
The complementarity predicted by the model is generally consistent with the 
anecdotal evidence of “influence” and “sorting” effects, which suggest that corporate 
investors can add value to portfolios in several ways (Sørensen, 2007). Though not 
formally developed in the model, the former suggests that corporate investors can 
increase the market value of portfolios through providing their complementary assets and 
commercialization capabilities (Park and Steensma, 2011). The latter indicates that 
corporate investors have a capacity to select promising portfolios (such as those with 
higher θ in the model) and provide positive signals to other stakeholders about the 
qualities of portfolios, resulting in increases in the market value of portfolios (Stuart et 
al., 1999; Shane and Scott, 2002). As a result, corporate investors can obtain the 
technological return by using the technology spillovers originated from portfolios and 
also obtain the financial return by increasing the market values of portfolios through 
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CVC investments. These mutual benefits created by CVC investments can result in the 
existence of complementarity between technological and financial returns.    
The prediction of complementarity is also consistent with the “window for future 
technology” perspective. This perspective suggests that corporate investors make CVC 
investments to track future technological trajectories and identify future technology 
partners. Because corporate investors can obtain better information about technologies 
pursued by portfolios through CVC investments, they can effectively decide to formally 
integrate the technologies through subsequent acquisition and licensing, thereby reducing 
some risk and adverse selection prior to committing substantial resources in integrating 
the technologies. Corporate investors that obtain the technological return by effectively 
identifying portfolios can also obtain the financial return because the subsequent 
acquisition and licensing will tend to increase the market value of portfolios, resulting in 
the existence of complementarity between technological and financial returns.
10
  
Conversely, financial return created by CVC investments can increase the 
technological return in several ways. First, corporate investors should maintain a certain 
level of financial return expected internally to support their CVC programs (Siegel et al., 
1988; Jensen, 1993; Gomper and Lerner, 2004). Unless CVC programs can demonstrate 
tangible results within a few years, they are likely to be hard-pressed to justify ongoing 
funding and senior management support (Hardymon et al., 1983). Second, if the financial 
return is sufficient so that CVC programs exist for a substantial period of time, these 
                                                 
10
 For example, if a corporate investor integrates the technology pursued by a portfolio through the 
subsequent licensing, the portfolio can obtain additional revenues (Caves et al., 1983; Katz and Shapiro, 
1985), enhancing demand (Shepard, 1987), facilitating collusion (Arora and Gambardella, 1990 and 1994; 
Lin, 1996; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), and complementary assets (Katila et al., 2008; Basu et al., 
2009; Maula et al., 2009). Moreover, if the corporate investor acquires the portfolio to integrate the 
technology, the acquisition per se is a harvesting event that realizes the financial return as well as the 
technological return. 
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corporate investors can increase the marginal rate of technological return due to learning 
effects. These learning effects occur because the accumulated experiences of CVC 
investments provide the corporate investors with common skills, shared languages, and 
similar cognitive structures that enable the two firms to effectively and efficiently 
communicate and learn from each other, enhancing learning and thereby increasing the 
technological return (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996). Finally, sufficient 
financial return often allows corporate investors to access more and better potential 
portfolios, resulting in increasing the technological return. Taken all together, I can 
expect to see the existence of complementarity between technological and financial 
returns created by CVC investments. A testable hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1. Technological and financial returns created by CVC investments 
are likely to be complements. 
 
3.2.3 Contextual Factors Impacting the Complementarity 
In this section, I bring together some ideas about contextual factors that impact 
complementarity between technological and financial returns by relying on a stylized 
discrete choice model, which will allow us to better structure the development of my 
hypotheses. In particular, I will consider four sub-groups of CVC investments using 
technological and financial returns as two demarcation lines as depicted in Figure 3.1. 
For obtaining these sub-groups, I split the sample between CVC investments generating 
technological and financial returns above and below the means, respectively. Group I 
represents CVC investments that result in low technological and low financial returns; 
group II are those with low technological and high financial returns; group III has high 
technological and low financial returns; and, finally, group IV has high technological and 
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high financial returns. Complementarity between technological and financial returns 
would result in sub-groups I and IV being more populated. To examine the contextual 
factors that tend to promote complementarity, I will search for factors that impact the 












Figure 3.1.  Types of return along the technological and financial returns 
 
Post-IPO portfolio 
 It has been argued that start-ups have several mechanisms, including patent, trade 
secrets, and timing their CVC financing to coincide with later funding rounds, to avoid 
unexpected technological spillovers or transfers (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Katila et al., 
2008). These mechanisms exist because start-ups often view corporate investors 
suspiciously due to the perception that corporate investors’ intents may be to expropriate 
their technologies (Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Start-ups often 
choose to time their CVC financing because acquiring and maintaining patents and trade 






















 This timing mechanism is more critical for early stage start-ups because it may be 
easier for corporate investors to appropriate these start-ups’ technologies (Katila and 
Mang, 2003). Specifically, these early stage start-ups may find it more difficult to protect 
their technologies from potential appropriation because their premature technologies are 
not fully embodied in their products (Katila et al., 2008). Corporate investors also find it 
easier to influence the product portfolios and strategic agendas of the early stage start-ups 
(Sahlman, 1990; Rivkin, 2000). In this early stage regime, corporate investors can obtain 
substantial technological return by either appropriating or influencing their portfolios’ 
technologies, products, and strategic agendas. As suggested by my model, the greater the 
technological return corporate investors obtain in this regime, the less financial return 
they gain because their technological return can come at the cost of destroying the market 
values of portfolios and thus decreases their financial return that is largely determined by 
the market values of portfolios. This occurs because technologies are often the most 
important assets for these portfolios. As a result, I would not expect strong 
complementarity between technological and financial returns in the early stage regime.  
 In the later stage regime, start-ups can more readily transfer their technologies to 
increase their revenues or market values through licensing or acquisition because they 
can relatively easily protect their technologies that are fully embodied in their products. 
Beyond obtaining substantial technological return in this regime, corporate investors can 
also gain a greater financial return than in the early stage regime -- because start-ups can 
more effectively protect their technologies and, hence, their market values. As a result, I 
can expect a stronger complementarity between technological and financial returns in this 
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later stage regime. As such, using portfolios’ IPOs as a demarcation line between these 
early and later stage regimes, I hypothesize:        
Hypothesis 2. CVC investments made in post-IPO portfolios are likely to enhance 
the complementarity between technological and financial returns. 
 
Technological diversity 
From the real option view on CVC investments, corporate investors that invest in 
more technologically diversified fields can obtain greater technological return 
(Ceccagnoli et al., 2011). This occurs because these corporate investors can access to a 
greater range of technological fields, which potentially increases outcomes on the upside, 
while limiting exposure on the downside. With the passage of time, they can truncate the 
left-hand tails of a performance distribution by avoiding technological fields that are 
unpromising. This creates a performance distribution curve that is skewed to the right, 
yielding asymmetric pay-offs (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004).     
In the high technological diversity regime, corporate investors can expect greater 
financial return than one that would be gained in the low technological diversity regime. 
This expectation is because start-ups that obtain financing from technologically 
diversified corporate investors are likely to find it easier to protect their technologies 
from the risk of corporate investors’ appropriation and, thereby, to protect their market 
values. Moreover, these corporate investors are less likely to immediately become future 
competent rivals in their technological space because they would need substantial time 
and resources to do so. Thus, I can expect strong complementarity between technological 
and financial returns in this high technological diversity regime.  
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Note that, contrary to the real option view, it can be argued that corporate 
investors that invest in technologically undiversified fields would obtain a substantial 
technological return because similar knowledge bases can increase the “marginal rate of 
learning.” In this low technological diversity regime, these corporate investors can easily 
appropriate start-ups’ technologies because of their similar knowledge bases and thus can 
destroy the market values of portfolios, resulting in a weak complementarity between 
technological and financial returns. In addition, these corporate investors are more likely 
to quickly become rivals, and thus destroy the market value of portfolios, than corporate 
investors in technologically diversified fields. Hence, I formulate the following      
Hypothesis 3. CVC investments made in technologically diversified portfolios are 
likely to enhance the complementarity between the technological and financial 
returns.   
 
3.3. Empirical Strategy and Data 
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
Three econometric approaches are widely used to test for complementarity: the 
“correlation,” “production function,” and “direct regression” approaches (Athey and 
Stern, 1998). The correlation approach, which has been popular due to its simplicity, tests 
conditional correlations based on the residuals of reduced form regressions of the 
variables of interest on all observable exogenous variables (Arora, 1996; Lokshin et al., 
2007). The production function approach tests a simple one-tailed t-test on the interaction 
term of the two variables of interest in the regression of a performance variable and thus 
examines the cross-derivative of the two variables. This approach is feasible only if a 
reasonable performance variable exists. However, in this study, it is difficult to find an 
appropriate performance variable (e.g., total return created by CVC investments). Finally, 
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the direct regression approach tests a one-tailed t-test on one variable of interest and all 
observable exogenous variables in the regression of the other variable of interest. 
Although these approaches can provide supportive evidence of complementarity, they 
cannot serve as definitive tests (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) because the estimated 
correlation and coefficients may be the result of common omitted exogenous variables 
(e.g., unobserved heterogeneity).
11
 These approaches provide consistent test statistics for 
finding complementarity only if unobserved heterogeneity does not exist in the model. 
Note that such a condition, however, is almost impossible to satisfy in applications such 
as strategy and other fields in management, in which the performance measure is usually 
associated with firm-level performance (Athey and Stern, 1998). 
Using the correlation and direct regression approaches, I seek evidence that 
supports the existence of complementarity between technological and financial returns. 
For a more definitive test, I then use the “indirect” approach that examines 
complementarity through an exclusion restriction on the regressions of the variables of 
interest, technological and financial returns.
12
 For example, I assume that the number of 
firms making CVC investments in a year (i.e., CVC fraction) is exogenous and affects 
only technological return. If technological and financial returns are complements, I 
should find a positive effect of CVC fraction on financial return as well as technological 
                                                 
11
 More specifically, Athey and Stern (1998) present how particular forms of unobserved heterogeneity can 
bias test statistics from these approaches in specific directions under two assumptions: two elements are 
independent or complements. Under the former assumption, the presence of positive correlation between 
the unobserved heterogeneity of the two elements yields (1) positive correlation between the two elements 
and (2) a positive estimate of the interaction effect in an OLS or 2SLS productivity regression. Thus, 
positive correlation in the unobservables results in a force for a positive bias in the estimate of interaction 
effects in a productivity regression. Under the latter assumption, if unobserved heterogeneity of two 
elements is independent, the bias on the interaction effect will always be negative.   
12
 Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), I regress the nonexclusive elements on the assumed 
exogenous control variables,   , as in the following model:            ,            ,       
       ,              . A variable that should directly affect only one of   or  , in the presence of 
complementarity, shows up significant in both regressions because the complementarity induces an indirect 
effect from this variable on the other   or  , respectively. 
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return because the complementarity induces an indirect effect from technological upon 
financial return. This indirect approach is important for two reasons. First, this approach 
provides a less noisy empirical assessment of complementarity than the other approaches 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Second, this approach does not require an appropriate 
dependent variable that is necessary for the production function approach to be regressed 
upon the interaction term of the variables of interest.     
To find contextual factors that may impact the return complementarity, I focus on 
searching for factors that significantly and positively impact the likelihood of CVC 
investments in sub-groups I and IV, as depicted in Figure 3.1. These factors can explain 
the joint occurrence of technological and financial returns and thus complementarity 
between these two types of return. I also estimate the correlation coefficients between 
technological and financial returns in different regimes (e.g., pre- and post-IPO regimes 
and high and low technological diversity regimes). If these regimes greatly impact the 
return complementarity, I will observe significantly different correlation coefficients 
across regimes.  
3.3.2 Data 
 My data on CVC investments are drawn from the Deloitte Recap database. 
Because this study focuses on technological and financial returns created by CVC 
investments, I restrict my attention to firms that have at least a minimal probability of 
making CVC investments by selecting only those that have made at least one CVC 
investment. My data contain 1,491 firm-year observations that include 71 bio-
pharmaceutical firms (i.e., corporate investors) between 1985 and 2005. From this source 
I obtain information on CVC investment arrangements such as the identities of corporate 
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investors and portfolios and the dates, valuations, prices, funding amounts, and rounds of 
individual CVC investments.    
By focusing on the bio-pharmaceutical industry between 1985 and 2005, I gain 
several advantages in analyzing technological and financial returns. First, this 
concentration in a single industry allows us to use unique data sets that contain sufficient 
information to estimate technological and financial returns. Second, it is very hard to 
compare technological and financial returns across industries because each industry has 
its own technological and financial environments. Notwithstanding this concentration, 
my theoretical and empirical implications should be, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, 
applicable to other research-intensive industries. Furthermore, the time period between 
1985 and 2006 is reasonable for investigating these two types of return because it can be 
characterized as one of great expansion for the industry and intensive CVC investments 
(MacMillan et al., 2008).     
These observations created from the Deloitte Recap database are matched to drug 
pipeline data from the PharmaProjects database. This product pipeline data contains the 
history and progress of more than 36,500 drugs that have been developed since 1980. The 
number of drugs in each stage of development, which are classified as preclinical, Phase 
I, Phase II, and Phase III, is obtained and used to estimate technological return.  
This dataset is then combined with NBER patent data to estimate patent stock and 
technological diversity. To appropriately match with the NBER patent data, I used PDPC
O and Compustat GVKEY. The use of these two identification systems alleviates a potent
ial mismatching problem, in which assignee names do not necessarily correspond to the r
ecords within Deliotte Recap or Compustat, and appropriately tracks the changes of paten
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t ownership. Financial and accounting data is collected from Compustat.   
3.3.3 Measuring Technological and Financial Returns 
I measure two types of returns created by CVC investments. The first measure is 
technological return and reflects the extent to which CVC investments contribute to the 
research productivity of corporate investors. This measure primarily uses the information 
of products (e.g., drugs) within the research pipelines of corporate investors. The second 
measure is financial return and estimates the geometric average return (e.g., constant rate 
of return) on CVC investments.  
Technological return should estimate the portion of research productivity created 
by CVC investments rather than other factors that possibly impact the research 
productivity. I begin with a regression model: 
             ,                                                                                             (5)  
where    is the number of products and is weighted by transition probabilities for 
advancing to the next stage within research pipeline,
13
    and    are parameter vectors, 
and    is a set of variables that possibly impact research productivity other than CVC 
investments.    includes firm size (e.g., total assets), internal R&D (e.g., R&D 
expenditures), external R&D (e.g., prior alliance stock including acquisition, licensing, 
and collaborative research), and technological stock (e.g., patent stock). I predict base ŷ 
from the base regression that does not include the CVC amount as an independent 
variable as presented in Table 3.1 (please see Models 1, 3, and 5).  
                                                 
13
 The transition probabilities for advancing to the next stage are 0.71, 0.44, and 0.69 in Phase I, II, and III, 
respectively (Grabowski and Kyle, 2008). For example, if 100 compounds are in Phase I, 21 compounds 
can emerge in the market. Phase I is the earliest trials in the life of a new compound or treatment and is 
usually small trials, recruiting anything up to about 30 patients or a lot less. Phase II expands trials to 
patients who have same type of disease and aims to find out the extant, side-effects, appropriate usage of 
compounds. Phase III compares new compounds with the best currently available treatment (the standard 
treatment) and releases them if they pass. 
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Table 3.1. Regressions for estimating technological return 
 
Panel A: OLS regressions predicting the number of products 
 OLS 












































(0.1150) (0.1118) (0.3154) (0.3073) (0.3238) (0.3205) 
Internal R&D (t-1) 
0.0006 0.0006 0.0018 0.0018 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0020) 





















































(0.6125) (0.5968) (1.6886) (1.6481) (1.7453) (1.7228) 
       
N 901 901 901 901 901 901 
F 73.6656 64.3872 85.5742 72.8932 44.1121 39.4661 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R
2
 0.4568 0.4713 0.4994 0.5128 0.2601 0.2739 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for three types of technological return  
 N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Technological return (weighted) 901 3.63e-09 -0.1411 0.7680 -0.9194 9.4525 
Technological return (total) 901 -3.52e-08 -0.3564 1.9392 -2.3216 23.8680 
Technological return (pre-clinical) 901 -2.65e-09 -0.3838 2.0886 -2.5004 25.7058 






 denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
I also predict treated ŷ from the treated regression that does include CVC amount as an 
independent variable (please see Models 2, 4, and 6). I then calculate the differences 
between the treated ŷ and base ŷ (i.e., treated ŷ-base ŷ) to use these differences to proxy 
for the effect of CVC investments on a firm’s research productivity. Because treated ŷ 
can be viewed as a projection onto the linear space spanned by CVC amount, which is 
not projected in base ŷ, along with   , this measure can be understood as technological 
return, which is isolated from those of other factors (e.g.,   ) on the number of products, 
created by CVC investments. For robustness measure, I use three measures of the number 
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of products, including the number of products weighted by the probabilities of advancing 
to the next stage within stage I, II, and III (e.g., Models 1 and 2), the total number of 
products within stage I, II, and III (e.g., Models 3 and 4), and the number of products 
within pre-clinical stage (e.g., Models 5 and 6). I use the estimates calculated from 
Models 1 and 2 as a proxy of technological return in the following analyses. Panel B 
reports descriptive statistics for the estimates calculated from Models 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 
and 5 and 6, respectively. For example, technological return (weighted) is the estimates 
calculated from Models 1 and 2.  
As noted, I estimate the geometric average return on CVC investments as a proxy 
of financial return by using the information from Deloitte Recap that provides the prices 
and dates of stocks at several points, including purchase, IPO, and last valuation. I 
construct this variable as follows:  
   (    )
 
   ,                                                                                              (6) 
where    is the geometric average return applicable on each subset period n,    is the 
cumulative return over the entire period, and n is the number of equal subset periods to 
average the return. For the sample in which CVC investments are made in pre-IPO 
portfolios that do go public afterward,    is estimated by using IPO price per share. For 
the sample in which CVC investments are made in post-IPO portfolios or pre-IPO 
portfolios that do not go public afterward,    is estimated by using the last funding 
activity price. The last funding activity includes acquisition and other forms of fund-
raising activities by portfolios. I finally calculated the weighted mean of    with the 
amounts of individual CVC investments for firm i in year t. 
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 This geometric average return can directly gauge the financial performance of 
CVC investments. Prior studies on CVC investments have been hampered in estimating 
financial return because of the lack of data availability in which researchers cannot 
directly observe when and how corporate investors liquidate their investments. As a 
result, IPO rate and IPO post-valuation are widely used to measure financial return on 
CVC investments (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Maula and Murray, 2002; Henderson 
and Leleux, 2003). These IPO-based measures, however, have serious problems in 
measuring financial return. First, inconsistent with a widely held assumption that most 
CVC investments are made in pre-IPO portfolios, a substantial number of CVC 
investments are made in post-IPO portfolios.
14
 Second, such measures are not normalized 
by the holding period of stock; therefore, it is impossible to obtain a sense of return rate 
in equal subset periods.  
3.3.4 Independent Variables and Control Variables 
Post-IPO. One of my independent variables is whether corporate investors make 
their investments in pre- or post-IPO portfolios. I therefore simply construct an indicator 
variable that equals one if firm i makes CVC investments in post-IPO portfolios and zero 
otherwise.    
Technological diversity. The U.S. Patent Office has developed a highly elaborate 
classification system for the technology to which the patented inventions belong, 
consisting of about 400 main patent classes and over 120,000 patent sub-classes. Using 
these patent classes, I calculate the number of patents (e.g., p) that share first three digits 
of patent class between firm i and its portfolios and then calculate technological diversity 
                                                 
14
 For example, my sample indicates that 43 percent of CVC investments (e.g., 338 out of 796 CVC 
investments) were made in post-IPO portfolios. 
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by using [1/(1+p)]. Thus, a greater number of this estimate would indicate more 
technological diversity between firm i and its portfolios. 
R&D intensity. Coupled with the absorptive capacity discussion, a firm’s ability 
to evaluate, assimilate, and apply new technology can impact technological and financial 
returns. To control this absorptive capacity, I control the amount of R&D expenses 
divided by total assets. This variable is estimated at t and t-1, where t denotes the year in 
which CVC investments are made.     
Size. Since Schumpeter (1943)’s work, firm size has traditionally been an 
important control variable to estimate a firm’s technological performance. While larger 
firms may enjoy economies of scale and scope, smaller firms are associated with less 
bureaucracy and thus may make decisions more efficiently on technological activities 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1987). I use total assets to control firm size. 
Growth rate. I include a number of measures (e.g., growth rate, cash flow, and 
leverage) commonly used in the analysis of financial performance as control variables 
because this financial performance can determine the level of resources that allow 
making CVC investments. I control growth rate calculated as the annual percent change 
in revenues. 
Cash flow. This variable is estimated as net income after interest and taxes plus 
depreciation and amortization.   
Leverage. This variable calculates the degree to which the firm is leveraged using 
the ratio of its total debt to total assets. 
  Multinationality. Corporate investors can use CVC investments to expand their 
international markets rather than to pursue technological and financial returns. To control 
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this strategic motive of CVC investments, I use an indicator variable that equals one if 
firm i involves in international markets and zero otherwise.  
Headquarter (U.S.). Because each country has its own institutional environment, 
a firm’s location can impact technological and financial returns. To control this 
institutional impact, I use an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is headquartered 
in U.S. and zero otherwise.  
SIC(28). Because each industry has its own technological and managerial context, 
industrial specific effects on technological and financial returns should be controlled. 
Although this study focuses on the bio-pharmaceutical industry, I use an indicator 
variable that equals one if the first two digits of SIC code are 28 and zero otherwise to 
more elaborately control these industrial specific effects.  
3.4 Empirical Findings 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,491 firm-year 
observations that include 71 corporate investors between 1985 and 2005. This table 
reports the mean (Mean) and standard deviation (S.D.) of variables used in the following 
analyses. The column of all samples includes all the observations in the dataset. The 
column of high (low) technological return includes the observations above (below) the 
mean of technological return. The mean and standard deviation of financial return in the 
column of all samples indicate that, on average, corporate investors gain 14.57 percent 
geometric average return and the distribution is widely dispersed. This great standard 
deviation is consistent with Allen and Hevert (2007)’s finding that corporate investors’ 
financial gains are widely dispersed and bimodally distributed. Note that consistent with 
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Hypothesis 1, the mean of financial return is greater for the corporate investors that 
obtain high technological return (e.g., high technological return) over the corporate 
investors that obtain low technological return (e.g., low technological return). This 
consistency is supportive for a notion that technological and financial returns are 
complements. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution because it may 
be biased by unobserved heterogeneity.          
 By the econometrics method I used to estimate technological return, it is natural 
that the mean of technological is close to zero. Note that Table 3.1 demonstrates that 
CVC amount indicates positive and significant coefficients in the regressions predicting 
the number of products (please see Models 2, 4, and 6). Based on this result, positive 
(negative) technological return can be understood as having relatively greater (smaller) 
impact of CVC amount on the number of products. 
Table 3.2. Summary statistics 
 





 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Technological return 0.0000 0.7680 0.7047 1.2944 -0.2277 0.1688 
Financial return 0.1457 0.9255 0.2239 1.1650 0.0527 0.4962 
Number of products (weighted) 2.6055 5.4781 1.8575 4.9635 3.4952 5.9149 
Number of products (total) 6.9396 14.4105 4.8346 12.9005 9.4435 15.6677 
Number of products (pre-clinical) 6.5667 14.8480 4.3049 12.8025 9.2570 16.5751 
CVC amount 3.8299 15.9630 6.6361 21.1966 0.4922 1.8120 
Size 7.5212 2.3173 6.5403 2.7733 7.9317 1.9585 
Internal R&D (t-1) 745.2666 1181.0385 625.4763 988.4279 784.8449 1236.2181 
Internal R&D (t) 785.1533 1248.0985 561.4600 948.8926 878.1125 1342.8215 
Patents 57.7907 198.3860 24.7654 125.8403 97.0720 254.0742 
External R&D 12.2280 21.0673 6.2012 14.0244 19.3965 25.3731 
Return type 0.5064 0.5001 0.1222 0.3277 0.9633 0.1882 
Post-IPO 0.8947 0.3070 0.8506 0.3567 0.9471 0.2239 
Technological diversity 0.9070 0.2674 0.9145 0.2666 0.8979 0.2684 
R&D intensity (t-1) 0.1379 0.1540 0.1816 0.2058 0.1235 0.1295 
R&D intensity (t) 0.1370 0.1509 0.1818 0.2213 0.1184 0.1037 
Growth rate 0.4098 2.2061 0.5063 2.9642 0.3787 1.8994 
Cash flow 1.2382 2.1123 0.8898 1.5781 1.3826 2.2832 
Leverage 0.3872 0.2027 0.3445 0.2106 0.4047 0.1969 
Multinationality 0.2435 0.4293 0.1321 0.3388 0.3759 0.4847 
Headquarter (U.S.) 0.4594 0.4985 0.2543 0.4357 0.7034 0.4571 
SIC (28) 0.5815 0.4935 0.3383 0.4734 0.8708 0.3357 
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Notes. For the definitions of variables, please see Appendix A.  
 
3.4.2 Existence of Complementarity 
Table 3.3 documents correlation coefficients that examine the nature of the 
relationship between technological and financial returns. Panel A reports simple pairwise 
correlation coefficients among financial return at t, technological return at t, t+1, and t+2, 
where t denotes the year in which CVC investments are made. The correlation 
coefficients of interest are ones between financial return (t) and technological return (t), 
(t+1), and (t+2), respectively, presented in the first column. Consistent with my 
prediction made in Hypothesis 1, financial return (t) indicates significant and positive 
correlation coefficients with technological return (t), (t+1), and (t+2). These lagged 
correlation coefficients are not surprising because corporate investors may obtain 
technological return in a substantial time period even after CVC investments are made.     
Table 3.3. Interaction test (Residual analysis) 
 
Panel A: Correlations between financial and technological returns 
 1 2 3 
1. Financial return (t) 1   
2. Technological return (t) 0.274
***
 1  













Panel B: Correlations between residuals generated from the regressions of financial and 
technological returns on all observable variables 
 1 2 3 
1. Residual-financial return (t) 1   
2. Residual-technological return (t) 0.295
***
 1  

















denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
As noted, I use the correlation approach and report the results in Panel B. This 
table reports correlation coefficients among residuals generated from the ordinary least 
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square (OLS) regressions of financial return (t), technological return (t), (t+1), and (t+2) 
on all observable variables in the dataset, respectively. The correlation coefficients of 
interest are the ones between residual-financial return (t) and residual-technological 
return (t), (t+1), and (t+2), respectively, presented in the first column. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, residual-financial return (t) indicates positive and significant correlation 
coefficients with residual-technological return (t) and (t+1). Hence, using the correlation 
approach, I find supportive evidence that technological and financial returns are 
complements and that this complementarity is maintained for a year even after CVC 
investments are made.    
For obtaining more robust evidence, I use the direct regression approach and 
report the results in Table 3.4. This table reports fixed and random effects regressions 
predicting technological return at t, t+1, and t+2. I estimate the following models: 
                   , where   denotes a set of technological return,   are 
independent variables of interest, and   are control variables. The independent variable of 
interest is financial return. Models 1 through 3 report fixed effects and Models 4 through 
6 report random effects regressions. Note that consistent with Hypothesis 1, financial 
return indicates significant and positive coefficients on technological return (t) and (t+1) 
as shown in Models 1, 2, 4, and 5. This result is consistent with my finding in the 
correlation approach and also suggests that technological and financial returns are 
complements and that this complementarity maintains for a year even after CVC 
investments are made.   
Table 3.4. Interaction test (Regression analysis) 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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(0.0585) (0.0620) (0.0228) (0.0633) (0.0539) (0.0273) 
R&D intensity (t-1) 
0.0645 -0.2254 -0.0953 0.0429 -0.1992 -0.0277 
(0.0759) (0.2073) (0.1398) (0.0877) (0.1565) (0.0975) 
R&D intensity (t) 
-0.0778 0.1131 -0.2537 0.0057 0.2599 0.0003 
(0.1107) (0.3039) (0.2371) (0.1279) (0.2094) (0.1595) 
Size 
-0.0557 -0.0345 -0.0450 0.0003 0.0067 0.0088 
(0.0492) (0.0489) (0.0569) (0.0135) (0.0195) (0.0177) 
Growth rate 
0.0015 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0005 
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0037) 
Cash flow 
-0.0061 -0.0055 -0.0074 0.0002 -0.0053 -0.0086 




 -0.0623 0.0144 -0.1575
**
 -0.0914 -0.0504 
(0.0799) (0.1286) (0.1297) (0.0769) (0.1220) (0.1148) 
Multinationality 
   0.0106 0.0068 0.0072 
   (0.0489) (0.0519) (0.0535) 
Headquarter (U.S.) 
   -0.0415 -0.0313 -0.0259 
   (0.0580) (0.0655) (0.0679) 
SIC (28) 







   (0.0355) (0.0390) (0.0424) 
Constant 
0.2563 0.1241 0.1914 -0.1221 -0.2014 -0.2586
*
 
(0.4639) (0.4550) (0.3497) (0.1142) (0.1402) (0.1490) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate investor  
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
       
N 893 830 787 893 830 787 
F(χ
2
) 12.9518 4.4331 4.2161 137.9774 106.5523 102.7294 
Prob>F(χ
2
) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Overall R
2
 0.1332 0.0648 0.0252 0.1693 0.0807 0.0426 







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
The existence of complementarity can be tested by using the indirect approach. 
This approach, however, requires finding a reasonable variable that does impact either 
one of technological and financial returns and does not impact the other return. I 
hypothesize that two variables, including CVC fraction and CVC average amount, are 
likely to facilitate technological spillovers or transfers originated from start-ups in the 
industry and thus enhance technological return. CVC fraction is the number of firms that 
make CVC investments in the industry in the year. CVC average amount is the average 
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amount of CVC investments in the year. I also hypothesize that these two variables are 
not likely to directly impact financial return. These variables, however, may indirectly 
impact financial return because technological and financial returns are complements. 
Table 3.5 reports the results of complementarity test using the indirect approach. 
This table reports fixed and random effects regressions predicting technological and 
financial returns at t. I estimate the following models:                    , 
where   denotes technological and financial returns,   are independent variables of 
interest, and   are control variables. The independent variables of interest are CVC 
fraction and CVC average amount. Models 1 through 4 report corporate investor fixed 
effects, and Models 5 through 8 report corporate investor random effects regressions. 
Consistent with my prediction, CVC fraction indicates a significant and positive 
coefficient on technological return (t) as shown in Model 1 and also indicates a 
significant and positive coefficient, albeit to a lesser extent in the significance level, on 
financial return (t) as shown in Model 2. Similarly, the CVC average amount is 
significantly and positively related to technological return (t) as shown in Model 3. 
Similarly, the CVC amount is estimated with a significant and positive coefficient, albeit 
to a lesser extent in the significance level, when the dependent variable is financial return 
(t), as shown in Model 4. The weaker significances of CVC fraction and CVC average 
amount in Models 2 and 4 can be understood as reflecting the indirect effects of these 
variables on financial return. Taken together, I conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported.      
Table 3.5. Interaction test (Indirect approach) 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects 






























   0.0228
***
 0.0139   
(0.0065) (0.0092)   (0.0040) (0.0089)   





   0.0339
***
 0.0135 
  (0.0146) (0.0158)   (0.0080) (0.0138) 
R&D intensity (t-1) 
0.1689 0.2844 0.1384 0.2733 0.1293 0.2947 0.0962 0.2819 
(0.1232) (0.5379) (0.1274) (0.5466) (0.0951) (0.4748) (0.0985) (0.4768) 
R&D intensity (t) 
-0.2476
*
 -0.4459 -0.1657 -0.3553 -0.1737 -0.3014 -0.0804 -0.2255 

















 0.0020 0.0023 0.0006 0.0018 -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0026 
(0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0039) 
Cash flow 
-0.0096 -0.0275 -0.0138 -0.0296 -0.0066 -0.0245 -0.0075 -0.0249 









(0.0893) (0.2464) (0.0873) (0.2442) (0.0875) (0.3005) (0.0880) (0.3001) 
Multinationality 
    0.0116 -0.0154 0.0118 -0.0163 
    (0.0522) (0.0704) (0.0522) (0.0704) 
Headquarter (U.S.) 
    -0.0182 0.0593 -0.0217 0.0547 
    (0.0638) (0.0802) (0.0632) (0.0809) 
SIC (28) 






















(0.2876) (0.5245) (0.1593) (0.4201) (0.2016) (0.3433) (0.1212) (0.1906) 
         
Corporate investor 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
         
N 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 
F(χ
2
) 7.4111 1.8034 6.4424 1.5721 72.0626 20.4156 49.8943 15.7409 
Prob>F(χ
2
) 0.0000 0.1131 0.0000 0.1704 0.0000 0.0256 0.0000 0.1073 
Overall R
2
 0.0122 0.0021 0.0078 0.0002 0.0253 0.0117 0.0216 0.0097 







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
In Table 3.6, I use the ranking variables of technological and financial returns as 
normalized variables to compare the regression coefficients, rather than the significance 
levels, of CVC fraction and CVC average amount. I use fixed and random effects poisson 
regressions to predict the ranks of technological and financial returns (t). The greater rank 
denotes the greater technological or financial returns (t). Consistent with my finding in 
Table 3.5, CVC fraction has a significant and positive effect on technological return (t) 
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rank as shown in Model 1 and also a significant and positive effect, albeit to a lesser 
extent, on financial return (t) rank as shown in Model 2. Similarly, CVC average amount 
has a significant and positive relation to technological return (t) rank as shown in Model 
3 and also a significant and positive relation, albeit to a lesser extent, to financial return 
(t) rank as shown in Model 4. The smaller regression coefficients of CVC fraction and 
CVC average amount in Models 2 and 4 can be understood as the indirect effect of these 
two variables on financial return. Hence, I conclude that my finding about the 
complementarity is robust.        
Table 3.6. Interaction test (Ranking variables) 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects 



































   
(0.0004) (0.0003)   (0.0004) (0.0003)   










  (0.0007) (0.0005)   (0.0007) (0.0005) 


















(0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0118) 






























































































































(0.0107) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0085) 
Multinationality 
    0.1380 0.0587 0.1608 0.0624 
    (0.1862) (0.0560) (0.2045) (0.0577) 
Headquarter (U.S.) 
    -0.1030 0.0428 -0.1216 0.0339 
    (0.1945) (0.0585) (0.2136) (0.0602) 
SIC (28) 
    -0.0232 0.0588 -0.0304 0.0556 















(0.2876) (0.5245) (0.1593) (0.4201) (0.2558) (0.0828) (0.2791) (0.0850) 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
         
N 891 891 891 891 893 893 893 893 
χ
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prob>χ
2
 0.0000 0.1131 0.0000 0.1704 0.0000 0.0256 0.0000 0.1073 







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
3.4.3 Contextual Factors that Impact the Complementarity 
Beyond just identifying the existence of complementarity between technological 
and financial returns, I explore contextual factors that impact the complementarity using 
the four sub-groups depicted in Figure 3.1. Table 3.7 reports fixed and random effect 
logit regressions predicting the likelihood of CVC investments in sub-group I or IV. I 
estimate the following models:   (     )  
    (       )
      (       )
, where    denotes the 
probability of CVC investments in sub-group I or IV, and   are explanatory variables. 
The independent variables of interest are post-IPO and technological diversity. Models 1 
through 3 report fixed effects and Models 4 through 6 report random effects logit 
regressions. Note that consistent with my prediction made in Hypothesis 2, post-IPO 
indicates positive and significant coefficients on the probability of CVC investments in 
sub-group I or IV as shown in Models 1 and 3. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Similarly, consistent with my prediction made in Hypothesis 3, technological diversity 
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of CVC investments in sub-group I 
or IV as shown in Models 2 and 3. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported.    
Table 3.7. Regressions for identifying factors impacting the complementarity 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











Table 3.7. continued 
 











 (0.4277) (0.4404)  (0.3592) (0.3657) 
R&D intensity (t-1) 
-0.3614 -0.4851 -0.4372 -0.7263 -0.7330 -0.7011 
(0.8415) (0.8851) (0.8948) (0.7570) (0.8005) (0.8042) 
R&D intensity (t) 
-0.1616 0.2045 -0.0255 -1.3857 -0.7292 -1.0556 















(0.2468) (0.2446) (0.2535) (0.0918) (0.0948) (0.0981) 
Growth rate 
0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0048 0.0248 0.0114 0.0121 
(0.0349) (0.0341) (0.0355) (0.0378) (0.0367) (0.0380) 
Cash flow 
0.1012 0.0969 0.0803 -0.1384
*
 -0.0735 -0.1106 















(0.7793) (0.7778) (0.8033) (0.6267) (0.6624) (0.6755) 
Multinationality 
   0.5177 0.3312 0.4407 
   (0.3761) (0.4096) (0.4078) 
Headquarter (U.S.) 







   (0.4101) (0.4402) (0.4450) 
SIC (28) 
   -0.0930 -0.1272 -0.0846 
   (0.4243) (0.4538) (0.4594) 
Constant 







   (1.1220) (1.3847) (1.2521) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate investor  
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
       
N 769 769 769 893 893 893 
χ
2
 122.0990 128.1025 153.4869 108.9163 106.6314 118.8932 
Prob>χ
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.223 0.234 0.280    







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
For obtaining more robust evidence, I examine correlation coefficients between 
technological and financial returns across different regimes (e.g., pre- versus post-IPO 
regimes and low versus high technological diversity regimes). In Table 3.8, pre-IPO 
(post-IPO) regime denotes corporate investors that make their investments in pre-IPO 
(post-IPO) portfolios. Low (high) technological diversity regime denotes corporate 
investors that have lower (higher) technological diversity than the mean (i.e., 0.9069). 
Panel A demonstrates that correlation coefficients between technological and financial 
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returns are greater in the post-IPO regime than the pre-IPO regime. Similarly, Panel B 
demonstrates that correlation coefficients between technological and financial returns are 
greater in the high technological diversity regime than the low technological diversity 
regime. Consistent with my findings in the fixed and random effects logit regressions, 
these results suggest that the complementarity between technological and financial 
returns is enhanced when CVC investments are made in post-IPO and technologically 
diversified portfolios, respectively. Hence, my findings are robust.     
Table 3.8.  Correlations for identifying factors impacting the complementarity 
 
Panel A: Cohorted by post-IPO 







Panel B: Cohorted by technological diversity 













significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this study I investigate the nature of interaction between technological and 
financial returns created from CVC investments by systematically estimating these two 
types of return. Consistent with a simple model I develop in the paper, I find that 
technological and financial returns are complements. This complementarity is enhanced 
when CVC investments are made in post-IPO and technologically diversified portfolios, 
respectively. 
  Beyond providing a broad benchmark for heterogeneous returns on CVC 
investments, this study has important implications for corporate investors, start-ups, and 
researchers in strategy and finance. In particular, combined with anecdotal evidence in 
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the existing literature, it implies that CVC investments, as a strategy to accessing external 
technologies for corporate investors and alternative sources of financing for portfolios, 
can create value for portfolios as well as corporate investors. These mutual benefits can 
be greatly determined by when (e.g., post-IPO portfolios) and where (e.g., 
technologically diversified portfolios) CVC investments are made. Hence, my findings 
support the idea that an effective incentive mechanism (e.g., tax benefits) on CVC 
investments can serve to accelerate technological and managerial collaboration between 
corporate investors and start-ups. This implication is particularly important in the bio-
pharmaceutical industry in which technological and managerial collaboration between 
bio-tech and pharmaceutical firms is critical to generating profitable growth through 
enhancing research productivity.   
 This study has a few limitations. First, it is limited within the context of the bio-
pharmaceutical industry. Because the motives and decisions of CVC investments vary 
across industries, my findings should be interpreted with caution in the context of other 
industries. Finally, the proxy of financial return I used in the study is a hypothetical 
measure reached by using a belief that corporate investors primarily gain their financial 
return through IPOs and acquisitions. For more robust findings, it is needed to directly 




START-UPS’ CHOICE BETWEEN FINANCING FROM 
CORPORATE INVESTORS AND INDEPENDENT VENTURE 
CAPITALISTS AND ITS PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Start-ups are often resource-constrained and encounter several unique options for 
funding to successfully exploit their entrepreneurial opportunities. A central idea in the 
entrepreneurial finance literature is that external investors differ substantially from one 
another in their investment objectives and behaviors and the range of services provided to 
start-ups. This heterogeneity among different types of investors can have important 
economic consequences. A prominent example is offered by the corporate venture capital 
literature, which is relatively small in the finance literature and claims that corporate 
investors (CVCs) can provide not only financial capital but also quick access to markets, 
technological assistance, and product recognition through the marketing, distribution, and 
research support for start-ups. This unique attribute of CVCs can benefit start-ups in 
several ways that independent venture capitalists (IVCs) may not be able to emulate. In 
contrast, CVCs can be less well-aligned with start-ups’ economic interests than are IVCs 
because they may be more interested in the start-ups’ resources for their own uses than 
the start-ups’ successes (Hellmann, 2002; Katila et al., 2008). As a result, CVCs are often 
viewed suspiciously by start-ups and IVCs. This tension formed between start-ups’ 
resource needs and appropriation concerns is ubiquitous in the formation of 
entrepreneurial investment ties and can impact start-ups’ choice of financing from CVCs 
and IVCs and its subsequent performance.      
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Despite the importance of start-ups’ financial arrangements for their growth and 
success, little attention has been devoted to investigating the trade-offs involved with 
their choice between CVCs and IVCs and its performance implications. This gap in the 
literature enables me to study two interrelated questions: (1) when do start-ups finance 
their projects from CVCs and IVCs? and (2) how do these two entrepreneurial financing 
sources create value for start-ups?
15
 In most instances, the primary answer can be that 
start-ups finance their projects from CVCs when they need non-financial complementary 
assets that substantially influence their growth and success (Hellmann, 2002; Hsu, 2006). 
These questions, however, remain unsolved because IVCs also can provide such 
complementary assets by helping start-ups develop contracts with suppliers and 
customers (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Casamatta, 2003; Hsu, 
2004). These questions become even more complicated because start-ups often face a 
substantial risk of appropriation when they finance their projects from CVCs (Katila et 
al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2009).     
To address these issues, I develop a three-stage game theoretic model that 
distinguishes CVCs and IVCs in several ways, some of which are as follows. First, unlike 
IVCs that primarily pursue capital gains realized through the selling of stocks, CVCs seek 
strategic benefits from technological spillovers originated from start-ups as well as 
capital gains. CVCs are often motivated by these strategic benefits rather than capital 
gains (MacMillan et al., 2008). Second, start-ups face a substantial risk of appropriation 
when they disclose their technology/products to CVCs. IVCs have a minimal chance to 
                                                 
15
 Like many incumbents, start-ups can raise funds for their projects from several sources, including 
internal financing, IVCs, CVCs, private investors, banks, and other types of investors. This study focuses 
primarily on internal financing, IVCs, and CVCs because these sources are the most important sources of 
entrepreneurial financing.  
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appropriate start-ups’ technology compared with CVCs because they do not normally 
seek such strategic benefits sought by CVCs. Third, CVCs can provide their assets and 
capabilities, including technological and R&D support, product development assistance, 
manufacturing capacities, and access to marketing and distribution channels, to create 
value for start-ups. In contrast, IVCs can help start-ups access the capital markets and the 
terms under which they access these markets and better communicate start-ups’ value to 
the capital market. This model considers these unique attributes of CVCs and IVCs and 
relates start-ups’ costs and benefits of associating with CVCs and IVCs. The emphasis in 
the model is that the tension between start-ups’ resource needs and appropriation 
concerns is likely to be a primary factor in addressing the questions raised in this study.    
By analyzing 3,885 fundraising records of 616 bio-pharmaceutical start-ups 
between 1985 and 2006, this study provides a number of new results on start-ups’ 
financing choices and their performance implications. First, start-ups tend to finance their 
projects from CVCs rather than IVCs when they are in the later stages and need relatively 
small amount of capital. Second, CVCs tend to lead less syndicated investments 
compared with IVCs. Third, start-ups that possess better evaluated technology tend to 
raise funds for their projects from IVCs rather than CVCs. Fourth, start-ups tend to raise 
funds for their projects from CVCs rather than IVCs when their intellectual property is 
effectively protected and their research pipelines contain multiple products. Finally, while 
financing from IVCs contribute to increasing start-ups’ Tobin’s q and valuation, 
financing from CVCs contribute to enhancing forward patent citations.       
This study contributes to various strands of finance and management literature. 
First, it contributes to the literature on the formation of CVC investment ties (e.g., 
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Hellmann, 2002; Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 
2009). While the existing studies take the perspective of CVCs by assuming that 
investors dominate entrepreneurial finance decisions, this study takes the perspective of 
start-ups that can also be active decision-makers in their investment ties. Some 
observations have indirectly indicated that start-ups are also active decision-makers in 
forming investment ties. First, investors do not always get their first-choice investment 
opportunities (Gompers, 2002; Hsu 2004; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Second, CVCs 
tend to pay much by investing in overvalued transactions relative to IVCs (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998). Third, start-ups have the greatest flexibility to choose among potential 
investors or simply avoid investment ties with some investors (Katila et al., 2008). 
Consistent with these observations, the existence of such determinants studied in this 
study indicates that start-ups are active decision-makers in forming their investment ties 
(Stuart et al., 1999; Maula et al., 2003).    
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the trade-offs between the better 
evaluation of projects and the threat of appropriation (e.g., Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; 
Anton and Yao, 1994; Yosha, 1995; Ueda, 2004; Gans et al., 2008). While much of this 
literature considers a single type of investor, with the exception of Ueda (2004), this 
study advances our understanding about why several types of investors co-exist in the 
entrepreneurial financing market by highlighting the heterogeneous natures of CVCs and 
IVCs. By doing so, it helps start-ups to optimize their financial arrangements to enhance 
their growth and survival. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the contract design of control 
rights in bio-pharmaceutical alliances (Lerner et al., 2003; Higgins, 2007; Lerner and 
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Malmendier, 2010). While this line of studies focuses primarily on identifying the 
determinants of control rights, this study expands our knowledge regarding how different 
types of investors can impact the contract design of control rights in different ways.            
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model, solves for 
the equilibrium, and makes hypotheses. Section 3 presents data, measures, and the 
empirical strategy. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Model and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 The Set-up 
Consider a risk-neutral world with information symmetry among agents and no 
discounting. A start-up possesses its technology ( ), which greatly determines its fund-
raising capacity, and it needs an amount of capital ( ) to finance its project. CVCs and 
IVCs often evaluate   in different ways because they pursue their own motivations. 
Specifically, unlike IVCs that primarily pursue capital gains, CVCs often seek strategic 
benefits such as accessing the start-up’s technology and technological spillovers 
originated from the start-up.   is indivisible and cannot be sold separately yet because it 
is a mixture of the start-up’s research capacity and efforts and strategic agenda. The start-
up can finance its project from a competitive pool of CVCs and IVCs. There are two 
possible future states of nature that we call success and failure. Success occurs with a 
probability ( ). If the project fails, there is no return with    . The project yields the 
following:  
  (    ) ,                                                                                                    (1) 
where   is the expected return from the project and   is the rate of return. These 
variables are common knowledge.    
 83 
 This set-up relates closely to Ueda’s (2004) model, which analyzes the 
characteristics of start-ups that receive financing from a competitive pool of bank and 
IVCs. Her model suggests that start-ups characterized by relatively little collateral, high 
growth, high risk, and high profitability are likely to finance their projects from IVCs 
rather than banks. However, neither of the results/insights discussed in my model can be 
obtained by a simple extension of her study. My theoretical work is substantially different 
from her model because it examines a start-up’s two direct financing sources, which are 
irrelevant with respect to collateral. Furthermore, this set-up differs considerably from the 
models that take the perspective of investors (e.g., Anand and Galetovic, 2000; 
Hellmann, 2002; Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2009) by taking the perspective of start-ups. For 
parsimony, this set-up assumes that information symmetry exists among agents. This 
assumption is consistent with the notion that CVCs and IVCs can have the specialized 
knowledge and expertise to finance start-ups even when information asymmetries deter 
public market investors from providing equity (Lerner et al., 2003). This simplification 
does not cause a problem for further discussion because the purpose of this model is 
primarily to make predictions, which can be empirically testable, regarding the 
determinants of start-ups’ financing choice between CVCs and IVCs and its performance 
implications.     
4.2.2 The Sequence of Events 
A start-up first discloses its project and negotiates with IVCs rather than CVCs. 
This priority of IVCs is consistent with the stylized facts presented in Table 4.1, which 
indicates a notable pattern that IVCs tend to make their investments earlier than CVCs 
do. This pattern exists presumably because start-ups do not want to expose their 
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technology to the risk of appropriation by CVCs in their early stages (Lerner and Merges, 
1998; Katila and Mang, 2003; Katila et al., 2008). Specifically, these early stage start-ups 
may find it more difficult to protect their technology from potential appropriation because 
their premature technology is not fully embodied in their products and readily protected 
by the legal mechanism. Some prior studies have suggested that both CVCs and IVCs 
may be able to appropriate start-ups’ technology, and this threat of appropriation forces 
the start-ups to share some rent from the projects with these investors (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Ueda, 2004). This study, however, focuses on 
the risk of appropriation by CVCs because IVCs have a minimal chance to appropriate 
start-ups’ technology compared with CVCs.     
Table 4.1. Major corporate investors and independent venture capitalists 
 










Eli Lilly 36 387.24 0.89 0.08 
Genetech 26 173.27 0.77 0.08 
Elan 26 157.12 0.81 0.04 
Pfizer 25 184.66 0.76 0.04 
SmithKline 24 155.41 0.92 0.00 
Warner-Lambert 19 66.09 0.89 0.11 
Abbott 17 491.55 1.00 0.12 
Ciba-Geigy 17 102.75 0.76 0.12 
Genzyme 16 129.10 0.88 0.06 
Novartis 15 306.42 0.93 0.13 
     
Total 221 2153.61 8.61 0.78 
(Mean) (22.1) (215.36) (0.86) (0.08) 
 











Domain 44 477.82 0.20 0.89 
NEA 33 512.63 0.27 1.00 
H&Q 32 174.89 0.34 0.81 
KPCB 32 170.73 0.09 0.88 
Venture Investors 29 337.10 0.38 0.00 
UKN 26 87.92 0.19 0.00 
Alta 25 255.11 0.44 1.00 
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Table 4.1. continued 
 
IVP 25 186.22 0.24 1.00 
Mayfield 25 150.09 0.20 0.68 
HCV 22 93.20 0.19 0.91 
     
Total 293 2445.71 2.54 7.17 
(Mean) (29.30) (244.57) (0.25) (0.72) 
Notes. This table reports the number, amount, stage, and syndication of entrepreneurial finance by major 
corporate investors (CVCs) and independent venture capitalists (IVCs) included in the sample. These major 
investors are top-ten investors that record a high number of investments in each group. The amount of 
investments is calculated in millions of U.S. dollars. Late-stage investment denotes the ratio of investments 
made in the stages later than Series C (i.e., the median of investments stages in the sample) to total 
investments made by the investor. For example, Eli Lilly made 89% of its investments in the stages later 
than Series C. Syndicated investment denotes the ratio of investments syndicated with other CVCs or IVCs 
to total investments made by the investor. For example, Domain made 89% of its investments with other 
CVCs or IVCs.  
 
If a negotiation with IVCs fails to finance a project, the start-up discloses the 
project and negotiates with CVCs. There is a crucial difference between negotiations with 
CVCs and IVCs. CVCs maintain a stronger negotiation position than IVCs because, even 
if the negotiation fails to finance the project, they are still able to benefit by appropriating 
the project. Figure 4.1 illustrates the three-stage model of a start-up’s financing choice 
between CVCs and IVCs. Given the information symmetry among agents, the first stage 
of negotiation is irrelevant if the project is expected to be unprofitable, because IVCs will 
not finance it. As a result, IVCs are concerned only with whether or not they will finance 
the project and, if they do, the amount they will transfer to the start-up. In this situation, 
the contract can be described by just two parameters {    ,  }, where      is the amount 
of conditional transfer from the IVCs to the start-up under the contract if the project 
yields  . 
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Notes. This figure illustrates a model of sequential choice of start-ups for external financing. A start-up 
discloses its project and negotiates with independent venture capitalists (IVCs) in the first stage. If this 
negotiation breaks up, the start-up discloses its project and negotiates with corporate investors (CVCs) in 
the second stage. The CVCs determine whether or not to finance in the third stage. 
 
Figure 4.1. A model of sequential choice for external financing 
 
 
The start-up can face two options in the second stage: raise funds from IVCs or 
negotiate with CVCs. If the start-up finances its project from the IVCs and the project is 
successful, the IVCs’ expected payoff is            , and the start-up’s payoff is 
    . If the start-up finances its project from the IVCs and the project is not successful, 
the IVCs’ expected payoff is     and the start-up’s payoff is –  . If the start-up fails to 
finance its project from IVCs and negotiates with CVCs, the IVCs and the start-up have 
zero net payoffs and   still belongs to the start-up.       
If the start-up fails to raise funds from IVCs, it discloses its project and negotiates 
with CVCs. As mentioned, CVCs have a substantial chance of appropriating the start-
up’s technology for their own sake because they often pursue strategic benefits rather 
than capital gains (Hellmann, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; MacMillan et al., 
2008; Katila et al., 2008). More specifically, CVCs use their entrepreneurial investments 
Finances through CVCs Unable to finance  
Finances through IVCs Negotiates with CVCs 
Negotiates with IVCs 
 87 
as exploratory initiatives to create boundary-spanning ties with start-ups that often pursue 
new technology (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a and b; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Basu et 
al., 2009). This notion is particularly validated because CVCs are often viewed 
suspiciously by start-ups and IVCs due to the perception that their intent may be to 
expropriate start-ups’ technology (Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). 
Although IVCs can appropriate start-ups’ technology by passing the project content to 
firms in which they have already invested and having these firms undertake the project, 
this motivation is much smaller or, more likely, marginal compared with that of CVCs.     
If CVCs appropriate a start-up’s technology, they should pay a certain amount of 
compensation to the start-up. The amount of compensation is often determined by the 
nature of appropriation. If the appropriation is not technology- and product-specific and 
does not hurt the start-up’s intellectual property, the amount of compensation may not be 
great. In the other cases, the amount of compensation may be much greater. Let 
 (     ) be the expected amount of compensation by appropriation, where   is the 
parameter that indicates how tightly the start-up’s technology (intellectual property) is 
protected and   is the parameter that indicates how many following products can be 
developed by the start-up’s technology. For example, the index   is large if the start-up 
finances the project in its later stage because its technology is more mature and more 
fully embodied in its product (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Katila et al., 2008). Because   is 
evaluated earlier than the future appropriation, I assume that   does not impact  . The 
index   is great if the start-up is developing multiple following products in its research 
pipeline using its technology appropriated by the CVCs. It is assumed that       
 88 
and that   is nondecreasing in  ,  , and  . Because    , CVCs are encouraged to 
appropriate the start-up’s technology. 
The CVCs determine whether or not to finance the project in the third stage. The 
contract states whether or not the CVCs finance   to undertake the project and the 
amount they will transfer to the start-up,     , under the contract if the project yields  . 
If the CVCs decline to finance the project, they can undertake the project on their own. If 
the CVCs do so, their expected payoff is    . If the CVCs decline to finance the 
project and do not undertake the project on their own, their payoff is zero. If the CVCs 
finance the project, their expected payoff is            , and the start-up’s payoff 
is     . For simplicity, this model does not consider a repeated game, in which some 
stages repeat.  
4.2.3 Equilibrium 
I use the concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to solve and characterize the 
equilibrium strategies of agents. Because this equilibrium must satisfy backward 
induction, I begin by solving an equilibrium strategy for the start-up and CVCs in the 
third stage. If the CVCs decline to finance the project, their optimal strategy is to 
appropriate the project because      , resulting in the fact that their expected return 
is equal to    . As a result, the start-up should guarantee the CVCs a payoff at least as 
much as     to encourage the CVCs to finance the project. If the CVCs finance the 
project, their expected payoff is       . Hence, if            and       , 
the CVCs will finance the project. Because the start-up wants to maximize its payoff, 
which is equal to     , the following lemma immediately follows. 
Lemma 1. Let      be the start-up’s equilibrium payoff in the third stage; then 
      . 
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In equilibrium in the second stage, the start-up should raise funds from IVCs only 
if the contract gives it at least as much as     . Given this start-up’s optimal strategy, 
IVCs’ optimal strategy can be solved in two steps. First, the start-up’s equilibrium payoff 
in the first stage is derived. Let      denote the start-up’s equilibrium payoff if the start-
up finances its project from IVCs. Second, I compare      and      to examine from 
which source the start-up will finance the project. The contract of IVCs often contains a 
term that      is proportional to  . Because of this term,  
    is maximized only if the 
IVCs’ payoff,              , is maximized. Thus,  
    is defined as a 
function of  . 
Lemma 2. Let      be the start-up’s equilibrium payoff in the first stage; then 
      .  
 
Although it is possible to mathematically solve      with some additional 
restrictions in the model, this study uses the functional form of      that is non-
decreasing in the variable of interest,  , in the following discussion. This simplification 
does not cause a problem because the main purpose of this equilibrium solution is to 
compare      and      with respect to the variables of interest. Furthermore, this 
simplification is helpful for parsimony. Note that if the IVCs’ offer does not guarantee at 
least as much as      for the start-up, the start-up will not finance the project from the 
IVCs. In other words, if          , the IVCs are never able to attract the start-up 
because the start-up will raise funds from the CVCs. It is also noteworthy that      and 
     are independent because CVCs and IVCs have different motivations in their 
investments. The following proposition follows Lemma 1 and 2. 
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Proposition. The start-up finances its project from the independent venture 
capitalists if and only if  
              ,                                                                                       (2) 
and it finances its project from the corporate investors otherwise. 
 
To be specific, let   be an index function such that, if equation (2) is satisfied, 
    and, if it is not,    . In other words, if the start-up’s characteristics give    , 
then it finances its project from the IVCs. If the start-up’s characteristics give    , then 
it finances its project from the CVCs.    
4.2.4 Empirical Implications 
Note that   is nondecreasing in  ; that is, if   is high, the start-up raises funds 
from IVCs and, if   is low, it does so from the CVCs.16 This prediction is consistent with 
the notion that the amount of entrepreneurial financing by IVCs is significantly greater 
than that by CVCs (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). This notion is supported by the simple 
statistics presented in Table 4.1. Specifically, IVCs are expected to “swing for the fences” 
that they identify and finance start-ups that are working on technology with great market 
potential (National Research Council, 2009). This expectation exists because   is 
proportional to   and IVCs are often compensated through management fees based on 
fund size as well as a fraction of profit from their return on invested funds (Sahlman, 
1990). In other words, start-ups with the great market potential of   can better attract 
IVCs that may provide sufficient capital for their projects rather than CVCs. Furthermore, 
these start-ups can alleviate the risk of appropriation by financing their projects from 
IVCs.     
                                                 
16
 This notion follows from the fact that the left-hand side of equation (2) is nondecreasing in  .  
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In contrast, CVCs seek investment opportunities that are not greatly impacted by 
the market potential of   evaluated by IVCs but by technology-specific factors, including 
technological proximity, fitness, and breadth. This is because their strategic motivations 
are not necessarily fulfilled with the great market potential of  . CVCs can even be 
reluctant to make investments in start-ups with the great market potential of   because 
they would experience a high level of competition with IVCs to obtain the investment 
opportunities. These start-ups can be reluctant to finance their projects from CVCs 
because they may not want to take the risk of appropriation if they can successfully 
finance their projects from IVCs. I posit a hypothesis as follows:    
Hypothesis 1. Start-ups that possess better evaluated technology ( ) are more 
likely to finance their projects through independent venture capitalists rather than 
corporate investors. 
  
Equation (2) also indicates that start-ups’ financing choice between CVCs and 
IVCs can be determined by how tightly their technology is protected. This is because   is 
nonincreasing in  ; that is, the start-up raises funds from CVCs if its technology is 
securely protected and from IVCs if it is not.
17
 This prediction is consistent with the 
perspective that emphasizes the tension between resource needs and appropriation 
concerns in CVC investment ties (Katila et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009; 
Maula et al., 2009). The central idea of this perspective is that, when start-ups consider 
whether or not to enter CVC investment ties, the resource needs push them toward the 
ties, while the appropriation concerns push them away. If start-ups can securely protect 
their technology and thus alleviate the appropriation concerns, they can readily utilize 
complementary assets provided by CVCs and enhance the resource needs in CVC 
                                                 
17
 This notion follows from the fact that the right-hand side of equation (2) is nondecreasing in  .  
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investment ties. As a consequence, CVCs become more attractive sources of financing 
for start-ups if the start-ups’ technology is securely protected and vice versa. I posit the 
second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. Start-ups that tightly protect their technology are more likely to 
finance their projects through corporate investors rather than independent 
venture capitalists.    
 
Note that the start-up’s financing choice between CVCs and IVCs also depends 
on  . This is because   is nonincreasing in   -- that is, the start-up finances its project 
from CVCs if the amount of compensation by appropriation is large and from IVCs if the 
amount is not as high. If a start-up holds many following products in its research pipeline, 
the threat of CVCs to appropriate the current project weakens because high potential 
penalty can discourage CVCs from appropriating the start-up’s technology. In the 
extreme case that    , the threat from CVCs is not effective at all. Furthermore, such a 
start-up may need more complementary assets provided only by CVCs, including 
manufacturing capacities and access to marketing and distribution channels, to 
successfully release their products in the markets. Hence, I posit the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3. Start-ups that possess multiple products in the research pipeline are 
more likely to finance their projects through corporate investors rather than 
independent venture capitalists. 
  
As noted, IVCs seek primarily to maximize their capital gains from invested 
funds by increasing the market values of start-ups in which they have invested because 
they are generally compensated with fixed management fees and profits from their return 
on investments. These investors can contribute to creating the market values of start-ups 
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by “professionalizing” start-ups’ management, including providing managerial and 
industrial expertise on the strategic agendas of start-ups and signaling the value of start-
ups to the capital market. In contrast, CVCs do not benefit commensurately from the 
changes in the market values of start-ups because they often pursue potential synergies 
between their existing assets and start-ups’ technology rather than capital gains on their 
investments. Specifically, these investors seek opportunities for future research 
collaborations with start-ups and thus may expand the use of start-ups’ technology by 
involving the subsequent research projects that utilize the technology.
18
 Taken together, a 
testable hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4. While financing from independent venture capitalists is likely to 
increase start-ups’ valuations, financing from corporate investors is likely to 
expand the use of start-ups’ technology.    
 
4.3 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy 
4.3.1 Data 
My primary data are drawn from the Deloitte ReCap database, which contains 
comprehensive bio-pharmaceutical alliance information. This database contains 30,000 
deal announcements with the underlying press releases and 24,000 SEC-filed contracts, 
14,000 bio-contacts, and round-by-round financing for over 700 bio-pharmaceutical start-
ups. I use the 3,885 fundraising records of 629 start-ups between 1985 and 2006.  
By focusing on the bio-pharmaceutical industry, I gain two advantages in 
analyzing start-ups’ financing choices and their performance implications. First, this 
concentration on a single industry provides unique datasets that allow me to obtain 
                                                 
18
 For example, the corporate venture capital arm of Eli Lilly and Company made a Series C investment in 
a genomics group, Millennium Pharmaceuticals Inc., in 1995, resulting in collaborative research efforts 
investigating the genetic causes of atherosclerosis and congestive heart failure in 1997. 
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sufficient information to investigate the issues of this study. Second, it is very hard to 
compare start-ups’ financing choices and their performance implications across industries 
because each industry has its own managerial and technological environments. 
Furthermore, the period between 1985 and 2006 is characterized as a time of great 
expansion of IVC and CVC financing activities in the industry, so it is appropriate as a 
research setting for this study (MacMillan et al., 2008).     
These observations are matched to drug pipeline data provided by the 
PharmaProjects database. This database contains the history and progress of more than 
36,500 drugs that have been developed since 1980. The stages of drug development are 
classified into the pre-clinical, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, and launched stages. Phase I is 
human pharmacology and requires small trials, recruiting up to about 30 patients or a lot 
less. Phase II is therapeutic exploratory and expands trials to patients who have same type 
of disease to find out the extant, side-effects, and appropriate usage of drugs. Phase III is 
therapeutic confirmatory; it compares new drugs with the best currently available drugs 
or treatments and releases them if they pass.    
These observations are then combined with NBER patent datasets to obtain patent 
information. To appropriately match these datasets, I use two identification variables: 
PDPCO and GVKEY. PDPCO was introduced in the NBER PDP project, which aims to 
facilitate the matching of patent data to the Compustat data maintained by Wharton 
Research Data Services. The use of PDPCO alleviates potential mismatching problems, 
in which assignee names do not necessarily correspond to the records within other 
databases, and tracks changes in patent ownership. The Compustat database provides 
accounting variables.     
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4.3.2 Measuring the Variables of Interest 
There are many challenges in estimating the market potential of technology ( ) 
because it is, in any case, multifaceted and heterogeneous and not directly observable. 
For these reasons, I use two measures that depend on the managerial and industrial 
expertise of CVCs and IVCs. The first measure is the number of investors (i.e., investor 
number) and estimates the degree to which the investor community widely recognizes a 
start-up’s technology. The second measure is the amount of funding (i.e., funding 
amount) and estimates the degree to which the investor community highly recognizes a 
start-up’s technology. Throughout the literature, patent information has been used 
intensively to estimate a start-up’s technological capacity. However, the inherent 
weakness of patent-based measures has been also widely discussed in the literature (Patel 
and Pavitt, 1995; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002; Graham and Higgins, 2007). Furthermore, 
given that bio-pharmaceutical firms patent prolifically, their patents can be a rather noisy 
measure to estimate  . Hence, these two measures of   can help me reach beyond the 
limitations of prior studies that depend on patent information in estimating  . A start-up’s 
patent stock is still controlled in the empirical models. 
Start-ups often protect their technology by several mechanisms, including patents, 
trade secrets, and timing their external financing to coincide with later funding rounds 
(Lerner and Merges, 1998; Katila et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the effectiveness of such 
legal defense mechanisms is invariant because this study focuses on a single industry. As 
a result, I use a start-up’s external financing timing to estimate the parameter ( ) that 
indicates how tightly a start-up’s technology is protected. I create an indicator variable 
(i.e., IP protection) that equals one if a start-up finances its project after Series C, which 
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is the median round in the sample, and zero otherwise. The rounds are classified by 14 
stages: founding, Series A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, secondary, and private placement 
in order. Acquisitions and IPOs are excluded because these stages can be viewed as 
harvesting events rather than financing stages. It is assumed that there is likely to be great 
  when a start-up raises funds in the later stages because later timing tends to make it 
more difficult for external investors to appropriate the start-up’s technology (Lerner and 
Merges, 1998). Specifically, it is easier for start-ups to protect from potential 
appropriation more mature technologies that are more fully embodied in products (Katila 
et al., 2008), while it is more difficult for investors to influence the start-up’s product 
portfolios and strategic agendas with the later timing (Sahlman, 1990; Rivkin, 2000). 
I use the number of drugs (i.e., future product) in a pre-clinical stage within a 
start-up’s research pipeline from the PharmaProject database to estimate the parameter 
( ) that indicates how many future products can be developed by the start-up’s 
technology. The great number of drugs in the pre-clinical stage indicates many future 
products. For the definitions of variables, please see Appendix B. 
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy 
 The two-sample means test and binary logistic regression are two common 
approaches that are widely used for analyzing dichotomous outcomes such as a start-up’s 
financing choice between CVCs and IVCs. These approaches, however, do not fit a 
realistic situation under which a start-up can finance its project from more diverse 
sources that may impact its choice between CVCs and IVCs. To attenuate this concern, I 
consider an alternative financing source for start-ups, internal financing, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. A start-up chooses between internal and external financing in the first stage. If 
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the start-up chooses external financing, it has two subsequent options in the second stage: 
IVC financing and CVC financing. For these multiple options, I consider the multinomial 
logistic regression.     
 
Notes. This figure illustrates a model of sequential choice of start-ups for internal and external financing. A 
start-up should decide to finance its project through internal financing or external financing in the first 
stage. If the start-up decides to finance its project through external financing in the first stage, it faces two 
options, including financing through independent venture capitalists (IVCs) and corporate investors 
(CVCs), in the second stage.    
 
Figure 4.2. A model of sequential choice for internal and external financing 
 
 
 However, the multinomial logistic regression can provide only supportive 
evidence for the variables that impact a start-up’s financing choice; it does not serve as a 
definitive approach. This limitation exists because the multinomial logistic regression 
may violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption in the model 
presented in Figure 4.2 that has a hierarchical structure of two-stage sequential decisions 
(Maddala, 1983). For example, given the decision-making process, the components of the 
error terms of IVC financing and CVC financing that pertain to the external financing are 
hypothesized to be jointly distributed. 
IVCs CVCs  
Internal financing  External financing  
N 
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 To alleviate this concern, I use the sequential logistic regression for a more 
definitive test that alleviates the violation of the IIA assumption. While the nested 
multinomial logistic model is used when the set of alternatives faced by the decision-
maker can be partitioned into subsets until the bottom level, the sequential logistic model 
is appropriate to use when a choice framework is the “elimination by aspects” process 
(Tversky, 1972). Because the elimination by aspects process is closely related to the 
decision-making depicted in Figure 4.2, I use the sequential logistic regression rather than 
the nested multinomial logistic regression. 
 For the sequential logistic regression, if I assume that each choice is made 
according to a dichotomous logit model, I can proceed as follows: Let              if 
a start-up chooses internal financing in the first stage, and IVC financing and CVC 
financing given external financing in the second stage, respectively. Let   represent the 
binomial logit function. Then the probability of external financing is defined as 
  (                  )    (    )   (         ),                         (3.1) 
where    is a vector of the observable characteristics of start-up  ,    is a vector of the 
attributes of Transition 1, and    and    are parameter vectors. The conditional 
probability of choosing CVC financing given external financing is:  
  (                                )    (         )  
  (         ),                                                                                             (3.2) 
where    is a vector of the attributes of Transition 2 and    and    are parameter vectors. 
The most direct method of estimating the parameter vectors,   , ...,   , is to proceed to 
the successive estimation of logit models with a smaller number of responses using the 
maximum likelihood. Therefore, I first estimate equation (3.1) with a logit model using 
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all observations in the sample; and I then estimate equation (3.2) with a logit model using 
observations for which     .  
 To address concerns about the potential endogeneity problem, I use two-stage 
probit regressions that predict the probabilities of start-ups’ financing through CVCs and 
IVCs. The variables of interest are instrumented by industry IPO, industry acquisition, 
and industry funding amount. For the definitions of these instrumental variables, please 
see Appendix B.   
For a sensitivity analysis, I use the survival analysis that predicts the hazard of a 
start-up’s financing through CVCs and IVCs. Specifically, I estimate the following 
models: 
  ( )  (      ) ,                                                                                            (4) 
where    is the hazard for   (       ),    are case-specific predictors, and   is the 
slope parameter. As a corollary analysis, I use the cross-equation constraints of seemingly 
unrelated regressions to determine whether the coefficients of the independent variables 
of interest estimated in the survival analysis are significantly different across the two 
groups in which the events (failures) are defined as      and     . 
 Finally, I estimate the performance metrics created by start-ups’ financing choice 
between CVCs and IVCs. This estimation poses many challenges for several reasons. 
First, many start-ups do not provide observable financial records that might indicate their 
performances because they are often private companies. As a result, the existing studies 
in the entrepreneurial finance literature often use IPO information, including start-ups’ 
IPO rate and IPO post-valuation, to estimate start-ups’ performance. These IPO-based 
measures, however, have a serious problem in effectively measuring start-ups’ 
 100 
performance because, inconsistent with the widely held assumption that most CVCs and 
IVCs invest in pre-IPO start-ups, my sample indicates that 43% of CVC investments 
were made in post-IPO start-ups (Kang and Nanda, 2011). Second, it is hard to define 
what portion of the performance of start-ups is created by CVCs and IVCs because their 
performance is, by nature, the aggregate sum of the effects of many factors that may 
impact their operations. Third, even though I estimate the portion of start-ups’ 
performance created by CVCs and IVCs, it is hard to estimate what elements of 
performance are respectively created by CVCs and IVCs because start-ups often use both 
IVCs and CVCs as their financing sources. Finally, in any case, the definition of 
performance is multifaceted and heterogeneous. To address these concerns, I use a simple 
econometric technique that will be discussed in the results section.  
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the number, amount, stage, and syndication of entrepreneurial 
finance provided by major CVCs and IVCs included in the sample. The first two columns 
(i.e., number and amount of investments) indicates that major IVCs made significantly 
greater investments reaching, on average, $244 million in 293 rounds compared with 
$215 million in 221 rounds by CVCs. This finding is consistent with the notion that the 
amount of capital provided by IVCs is significantly greater than that provided by CVCs 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; MacMillan et al., 2008; National Venture Capital 
Association, 2010). The column of late-stage investment indicates that, while major 
CVCs made, on average, 86% of investments in the stages later than Series C, major 
IVCs made, on average, 25% of investments in the stages later than Series C. The column 
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of syndicated investment indicates that major IVCs made more syndicated investments 
reaching, on average, 72% of investments compared with, on average, 8% of investments 
syndicated by CVCs. This finding supports a widely held assumption that CVCs typically 
seek co-invest with IVCs and use them for identifying quality investment opportunities 
(Dushnitsky, 2006) because many CVCs tend to participate in the syndicated investments 
led by IVCs. Furthermore, an interesting interpretation for this finding is that CVCs tend 
to be reluctant to co-invest with IVCs when they are leading investors in the syndicated 
investments. This is because IVCs aligned with start-ups’ interests can prevent the 
leakage of start-ups’ technology and discourage potential appropriation by CVCs. A part 
of these findings are inconsistent with the findings presented in Chemmanur and 
Loutskina (2008). This inconsistency exists presumably because my study considers a set 
of bio-pharmaceutical start-ups compared with start-ups in a wider range of industries 
considered by their study. Moreover, my study categorizes syndicated investments made 
by both IVCs and CVCs into two groups by the nature of leading investor; their study 
considers CVC investments if a single CVC exists in the syndicated investments.      
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of 3,885 fundraising observations of 
616 bio-pharmaceutical start-ups between 1985 and 2006. Panel A reports the mean and 
standard deviation of variables used in the following analysis. The first column (i.e., all 
observations) includes all observations in the sample. The second and third columns (i.e., 
internal financing and external financing) include the observations in which start-ups 
finance their projects internally and through CVCs or IVCs. The last two columns (i.e., 
IVC and CVC) include the observations in which start-ups finance their projects through 
IVCs and CVCs, respectively. These two columns are the columns of interest and 
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indicate that start-ups financed from IVCs tend to have greater investor numbers 
reaching, on average, 1.816 investors compared with, on average, 1.167 investors of start-
ups financed from CVCs. This finding is consistent with my prediction made in 
Hypothesis 1. However, these two groups of start-ups do not indicate significant 
difference in terms of funding amount. Start-ups financed from CVCs tend to have 
greater IP protection reaching, on average, 0.758, which indicates 75% of investments are 
made in the stages later than Series C, compared with, on average, 0.410 of start-ups 
financed from IVCs. Start-ups financed from CVCs tend to have greater future product 
reaching, on average, 2.971 compared with, on average, 1.012 of start-ups financed from 
IVCs. These two findings are consistent with my predictions made in Hypotheses 2 and 
3. Furthermore, the variables of firm characteristics indicate that start-ups financed from 
CVCs are larger, invest more R&D resources, and possess more patents than do start-ups 
financed from IVCs. The variables of finance characteristics indicate that start-ups 
financed from CVCs tend to have greater prior financing from IVCs, CVCs, and major 
investors than do start-ups financed from IVCs. These distinguishable characteristics 
should be interpreted with caution because these start-ups are in different stages when 




Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 All observations Internal financing 
External financing 
(IVC or CVC) 
IVC CVC 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Choice variable           
1. Chosen 0.854 0.704 0.000 0.000 1.277 0.447 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.000 
           
Variables of interest           
2. Investor number 1.429 0.750 1.009 0.104 1.637 0.840 1.816 0.876 1.167 0.489 
3. Funding amount 1.968 1.005 2.179 1.074 1.896 0.969 1.896 0.986 1.895 0.926 
4. IP protection 0.527 0.499 0.570 0.495 0.506 0.500 0.410 0.492 0.758 0.429 
5. Future product 1.702 3.226 1.772 3.144 1.663 3.272 1.012 2.086 2.971 4.578 
           
Firm characteristics           
6. Firm size 3.468 1.209 3.422 1.152 3.501 1.248 3.211 1.179 3.804 1.248 
7. Internal R&D 2.352 1.221 2.273 1.315 2.410 1.145 2.169 1.043 2.657 1.194 
8. Patent stock 0.996 1.280 1.088 1.389 0.951 1.221 0.787 1.089 1.378 1.427 
9. International business 0.072 0.258 0.098 0.297 0.055 0.228 0.051 0.220 0.061 0.239 
10. Location (U.S.) 0.969 0.175 0.975 0.156 0.964 0.186 0.952 0.214 0.980 0.141 
           
Finance characteristics           
11. Prior IVC 0.697 0.460 0.566 0.496 0.762 0.426 0.734 0.442 0.834 0.372 
12. Prior CVC  0.311 0.463 0.358 0.480 0.288 0.453 0.194 0.395 0.535 0.499 
13. Major investor 0.131 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.397 0.153 0.360 0.307 0.462 
           
N 3885  1286  2599  1880  719  
 
Panel B. Sample distribution through time 
 All observations Internal financing IVC CVC Acquisition IPO 
Year Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount 
1985 71 217 22 18 35 105 14 93 1 86 11 82 
1986 96 261 33 17 53 177 10 67 1 300 33 425 
1987 127 320 37 12 74 243 16 64 0 0 24 315 
1988 155 494 37 13 88 354 30 127 0 0 9 118 
1989 172 524 45 17 102 349 25 157 5 431 14 135 
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Table 4.2. continued 
 
1990 178 623 37 57 116 442 25 123 4 183 14 193 
1991 214 906 67 204 119 575 28 126 3 722 46 1585 
1992 227 1009 66 175 119 578 42 255 1 23 57 2829 
1993 248 1545 83 429 130 892 35 223 2 377 40 788 
1994 222 1226 69 260 105 704 48 262 9 428 34 787 
1995 299 1950 96 478 136 928 67 542 17 1363 35 882 
1996 249 1699 67 289 122 869 60 540 12 2657 67 1977 
1997 257 2285 62 557 129 1211 66 516 23 4080 41 1263 
1998 224 2054 56 401 123 1234 45 418 25 3917 20 698 
1999 223 2816 69 1067 98 1307 56 441 31 11804 17 2490 
2000 277 6415 116 3162 118 2396 43 855 20 6570 59 4235 
2001 183 4603 81 1390 68 2474 34 738 15 17609 7 405 
2002 129 2779 55 991 45 1193 29 594 20 7374 8 3030 
2003 168 3384 89 1204 55 1408 24 771 23 17150 10 503 
2004 112 2616 62 1135 32 1086 18 393 9 4710 36 2176 
2005 39 900 25 504 11 312 3 83 22 6649 21 1640 
2006 15 368 12 271 2 89 1 8 7 10726 25 2231 
             
Total 3885 39002 1286 12660 1880 18936 719 7404 250 97159 628 28787 
(Mean) (176.59) (1772.82) (58.45) (575.49) (85.45) (860.74) (32.68) (336.58) (11.36) (4416.31) (28.54) (1308.50) 
 
Panel C. Correlation coefficients among the variables of interest 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Chosen     
2. Investor number 0.118
***
    




   

















Panel D. Means of the variables of interest between two groups of start-ups  










N 1880 719 2599 
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N 757 377 1134
 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics of 3,885 fundraising observations of 616 bio-pharmaceutical start-ups between 1985 and 2006. Panel A reports 
the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of variables used in the following analyses. The column of all observations includes all the fundraising observations in the 
sample. The column of internal (external) financing includes the observations in which start-ups finance their projects internally (through CVCs or IVCs). The 
column of IVC (CVC) includes the observations in which start-ups finance their projects through IVCs (CVCs). Syndicated investments made by both IVCs and 
CVCs are categorized by the natures of leading investors (i.e., CVCs or IVCs). Panel B reports the yearly information of internal financing, IVCs, CVCs, 
acquisitions, and IPOs included in the sample. Amount is calculated in millions of U.S. dollars. Panel C reports correlation coefficients among the variables of 
interest. Panel D reports the means of variables between two groups of start-ups financed by IVCs and CVCs. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The 











Panel B reports the yearly information of internal financing, IVCs, and CVCs 
included in the sample. The last two columns (i.e., acquisition and IPO) are presented to 
provide bench-mark statistics. This table indicates that start-ups finance $18,936 million 
(49% of total financing in the sample) from IVCs and $7,404 million (18% of total 
financing in the sample) from CVCs for their projects. The rest of the financing is 
internal. This finding is consistent with the results of recent surveys (e.g., MacMillan et 
al., 2008; National Venture Capital Association, 2010) that suggest that IVCs make 
significantly greater investments in start-ups than CVCs do. A possible explanation for 
this finding is that IVCs and CVCs have been guided by their own nature and motivation 
in their investments. More specifically, IVCs that primarily pursue capital gains should 
make large investments because their capital gains are commensurate with the amount of 
investments. In contrast, CVCs do not necessarily make large investments because their 
strategic motivations do not require a large amount of investment.     
Figure 4.3 illustrates the number and amount of internal financing, IVCs, and 
CVCs through time presented in Panel B. This figure is important because it allows me to 
investigate whether or not IVCs and CVCs have been available financing sources for 
start-ups through time. If either IVCs or CVCs were extremely scarce during a particular 
time period and not readily available, start-ups’ financing choice would be heavily 
impacted by the availability of financing sources rather than the contextual factors I 
study. If this concern is not the case, we should see a notable pattern that the amounts of 
financing from IVCs and CVCs move together over time. This figure indicates that the 
number and amount of financing from IVCs and CVCs together gradually increased in 
the 1990s, peaked in the early 2000s, and gradually decreased afterward.         




Panel B. The amount of investments  
 
Notes. This figure illustrates the yearly information of internal financing, IVCs, and CVCs in the sample. 
Amount is calculated in millions of U.S. dollars. Syndicated investments made by both IVCs and CVCs are 
categorized by the natures of leading investors (i.e., CVCs or IVCs).   
 
Figure 4.3. Sample distribution through time 
 
 
Panel C reports correlation coefficients among the variables of interest. 
Interestingly, the variables of interest, including chosen, investor number, funding 
amount, IP protection, and future product, are significantly correlated with each other. 









































































































































































































determining start-ups’ financing choice between IVCs and CVCs and thus should be 
included in the analysis. It is also noteworthy that investor number and funding amount 
indicate a significant and positive correlation coefficient at the 1% level. This correlation 
suggests that these two measures of   have a convergent validity that is the degree to 
which an operation is similar to other operations that theoretically should also be similar. 
This concept of convergent validity is widely used in various fields to examine the 
effectiveness of multiple measures that estimate a single construct. By the same token, it 
is not surprising that IP protection and future product indicate a significant and positive 
correlation coefficient at the 1% level because both   and   are nondecreasing in  . 
Panel D reports the means of the variables of interest between two groups of start-
ups financed by IVCs and CVCs. Consistent with my prediction made in Hypothesis 1, 
the mean of investor number in the group of start-ups financed from IVCs is significantly 
greater than that in the group of start-ups financed from CVCs. In contrast, the mean of 
funding amount in the group of start-ups financed from IVCs is not significantly different 
from that in the group of start-ups financed through CVCs. These contrasting results 
should be examined with better elaborated econometric approaches because a t-test does 
not provide robust results to the omitted variable bias. The means of IP protection and 
future product in the group of start-ups financed from CVCs are significantly greater than 
those in the group of start-ups financed from IVCs. These statistics support my 
predictions made in Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively. 
4.4.2 Start-ups’ Financing Choice between CVCs and IVCs 
Table 4.3 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions predicting the linear 
probabilities that start-ups finance their projects from CVCs and IVCs. I estimate the 
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following models:              , where    is an indicator variable that equals one 
(zero) if a start-up finances its project from CVCs (IVCs). The independent variables of 
interest are investor number, funding amount, IP protection, and future product. Models 1 
and 2 indicate that investor number and funding amount are associated with 24% and 
15% decreases in the probability that start-ups finance their projects from CVCs rather 
than IVCs, respectively. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. Models 3 and 4 indicate that 
IP protection and future product are associated with 23% and 2% increases in the 
probability that start-ups finance their projects from CVCs rather than IVCs, respectively. 
These findings support Hypotheses 2 and 3. Firm size and location (U.S.) indicate 
positive and significant coefficients across models. These results suggest that start-ups 
financed from CVCs tend to be larger and headquartered in the United States than do 
start-ups financed from IVCs. Major investor also indicates positive and significant 
coefficient across models. This finding suggests that start-ups financed from CVCs tend 
to more strongly want to finance their projects from major investors than do start-ups 
financed from IVCs.    
Table 4.3. Hypothesis test using linear probability regressions 
 
 OLS 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




    -0.202
***
 




   -0.068
***
 







  (0.058)  (0.055) 
Future product 


















(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Internal R&D 
0.002 0.019 -0.007 -0.009 0.000 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
Patent stock  
-0.020 -0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.020 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
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Table 4.3. continued 
 
International business 
0.015 0.009 0.043 0.072 0.020 






















(0.072) (0.077) (0.080) (0.078) (0.075) 
Prior CVC 
0.020 0.028 0.052 0.080
*
 -0.018 
























(0.441) (0.270) (0.469) (0.248) (0.260) 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 554 552 554 553 551 
F 9.827 7.431 6.227 6.045 10.070 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.360 0.300 0.263 0.251 0.384 
Notes. This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions predicting the linear probabilities of 
start-ups’ financing through corporate investors (CVCs) and independent venture capitalists (IVCs). I 
estimate the following models:              , where    is an indicator variable that equals one 
(zero) if a start-up finances its project through CVCs (IVCs). The independent variables of interest are 
investor number, funding amount, IP protection, and future product. Control variables are firm size, internal 
R&D, patent stock, international business, location (U.S.), prior IVC, prior CVC, major investor, and year 







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
To consider internal financing as an alternative financing source, I estimate 
multinomial logit (MNL) regressions predicting the probabilities that start-ups finance 
their projects from internal financing (    ), IVCs (    ), and CVCs (    ). 
Specifically, I estimate the following models: (    )  
    (    )
∑     (    )
 
   
,   {     }, 
where    are categorical or continuous explanatory variables. In Table 4.4, Panel A 
reports MNL regressions estimated with all the observations in the sample. The 
observations of      are set to a base group to ensure model identification. Models 1 
and 2 indicate that investor number and funding amount have negative and significant 
coefficients for the probability of      at the 1% level. These results suggest that 
investor number and funding amount are associated with significant decreases in the 
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probability of start-ups’ financing from CVCs with respect to IVCs, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. In contrast, Models 3 and 4 indicate that IP protection and future product 
have positive and significant coefficients for the probability of      at the 1% level. 
These results suggest that IP protection and future product are associated with significant 
increases in the probability of start-ups’ financing from CVCs with respect to IVCs, 




Table 4.4. Hypothesis test using multinomial logit (MNL) regressions 
 
Panel A. MNL regressions with the full sample 
 MNL regression 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























(0.451) (0.262)       (0.500) (0.264) 
Funding amount 
  0.111 -0.884
***





  (0.151) (0.172)     (0.192) (0.187) 
IP protection 




   1.347
***
 0.534 
    (0.365) (0.357)   (0.462) (0.400) 
Future product 






















(0.184) (0.172) (0.167) (0.163) (0.152) (0.149) (0.154) (0.155) (0.205) (0.201) 
Internal R&D 
-0.042 0.036 -0.050 0.113 -0.154 -0.047 -0.188 -0.107 -0.186 0.024 
(0.178) (0.195) (0.160) (0.179) (0.159) (0.169) (0.149) (0.169) (0.201) (0.220) 
Patent stock  
-0.078 -0.096 0.143 0.032 0.024 -0.024 0.114 0.017 -0.115 -0.121 























































 -0.044 -0.048 














































(1.649) (1.198) (1.615) (1.414) (1.151) (1.412) (1.035) (1.215) (1.770) (1.256) 
           
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N 950 943 950 939 932 
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Table 4.4. continued 
 
Log likelihood -690.862 -772.162 -783.793 -802.531 -628.522 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2
 0.329 0.245 0.238 0.213 0.379 
 
Panel B. MNL regressions with a limited sample excluding syndicated investments 
 MNL regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 















 -0.585   -1.610
***
 -0.926 
  (0.448) (0.514)   (0.539) (0.579) 
Future product 
    -0.095
**
 0.006 -0.072 0.026 
    (0.048) (0.033) (0.050) (0.036) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N 770 777 766 759 
Log likelihood -542.455 -587.524 -584.618 -526.640 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R
2
 0.305 0.254 0.249 0.318 
 
Panel C. Post estimation of MNL regressions 































Table 4.4. continued 
 























     -215.94 -125.50 180.89 0.00 
     -182.98 -121.97 122.02 0.00 
     -251.01 -112.30 277.42 0.00 
Notes. This table reports MNL regressions predicting the probabilities of start-ups’ financing through internal financing, independent venture capitalists (IVCs), 
and corporate investors (CVCs). I estimate the following models: (    )  
    (    )
∑     (    )
 
   
 ,   {     }, where    are categorical or continuous explanatory 
variables. Panel A reports MNL regressions estimated with the full sample. IVC (    ) is set to a base group to ensure model identification. The independent 
variables of interest are investor number, funding amount, IP protection, and future products. Control variables are firm size, internal R&D, patent stock, 
international business, location (U.S.), prior IVC, prior CVC, major investor, and year fixed effects. Panel B reports MNL regressions estimated with a limited 
sample excluding syndicated investments (i.e., investor number>1). Internal financing (    ) is set to a base group. Investor number is excluded from the 
analyses because it has insufficient variance. Panel C reports the post estimation of MNL regressions. Panel C-1 reports joint tests that examine whether or not 
the independent variables of interest are statistically significant in determining the probabilities of financing through internal financing (    ), IVCs (    ), 
and CVCs (    ). For example, the significance of funding amount varies across alternatives (i.e., internal financing and CVC) in Model 2 presented in Panel 
A. The basic idea of this test is that, if this variable is significant in determining the probabilities of financing through the alternatives, adding or deleting it will 
significantly affect the log likelihood of the models. The significant value of test statistic (Prob>χ2) indicates that this variable significantly affects the log 
likelihood of the models. Panel C-2 reports the predicted probabilities of financing through internal financing, IVCs, and CVCs. Panel C-3 reports Small-Hsiao 
tests that examine the validity of independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. The basic idea of this test is that, if the IIA assumption is satisfied, 
adding or deleting an alternative does not significantly affect the odds among the remaining alternatives. The significant value of test statistic (Prob>χ2) indicates 












Panel B reports MNL regressions estimated with the limited sample that excludes 
the observations of syndicated investments (i.e., investor number>1). Investor number is 
excluded in this estimation because it has insufficient variance. The observations of 
     is set to a base group to ensure model identification. Model 1 shows that funding 
amount indicates greater coefficient for the probability of      than that of     . In 
contrast, IP protection and future product indicate greater coefficients for the probability 
of      than that of     . These results are consistent with the results presented in 
Panel A, suggesting that my findings are robust regardless of the existence of syndicated 
investments in the sample. 
Panel C reports the post estimations of MNL regressions. Panel C-1 reports joint 
tests that examine whether or not the independent variables of interest are statistically 
significant in determining the probabilities of start-ups’ financing from internal financing, 
IVCs, and CVCs. For example, the significance of funding amount varies across 
alternatives (i.e., internal financing and CVC) in Model 2, as presented in Panel A. The 
basic idea of this test is that, if a focal variable is significant in determining the 
probabilities of financing through the alternatives, adding or deleting it will significantly 
affect the log likelihood of the models. The significant value of test statistic (i.e., 
Prob>χ
2
) indicates that the focal variable significantly affects the log likelihood of the 
models. The test statistics indicate that all the variables of interest are important in 
determining the start-ups’ financing sources because the test statistics are significant at 
the 1% level.  
Panel C-2 reports the predicted probabilities of start-ups’ financing from internal 
financing, IVCs, and CVCs. These predicted probabilities indicate that internal financing 
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(41%) is the financing source that is the most often used by start-ups, followed by IVCs 
(30%) and CVCs (29%). These results are consistent with the concern discussed with 
Figure 4.3 that start-ups can finance their projects from more diverse sources other than 
IVCs and CVCs. Furthermore, I need to investigate whether or not this internal financing 
impacts the probabilities of start-ups’ choice between IVCs and CVCs because MNL 
regressions assume the IIA condition.   
 Panel C-3 reports Small-Hsiao tests that examine the validity of IIA assumption. 
The basic idea of this test is that, if the IIA assumption is satisfied, adding or deleting an 
alternative does not significantly affect the odds among the remaining alternatives. The 
significant value of test statistic (i.e., Prob>χ
2
) indicates that the IIA assumption has been 
violated. The test statistics are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the IIA 
assumption is violated. As a result, I should refine and improve my search for more 
definitive evidence by using the sequential logit regression. 
 Table 4.5 reports sequential logit regressions that predict the probabilities of start-
ups’ financing from internal financing and external financing (i.e., IVCs or CVCs) at the 
first transition and the probabilities of start-ups’ financing from IVCs and CVCs at the 
second transition. Transitions denote the choice nodes presented in Figure 4.2. The 
transition of interest is the second transition. Panel A reports bench-mark results and the 
sequential logit regressions discussed in Section 3. Models 1 and 2 indicate that investor 
number and funding amount have negative and significant coefficients for the probability 
of      (CVC) at the second transition. These results provide evidence that start-ups 
with better evaluated technology tend to raise funds for their projects from IVCs rather 
than CVCs, thus alleviating the IIA concern and supporting Hypothesis 1. In contrast, 
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Models 3 and 4 indicate that IP protection and future product have positive and 
significant coefficients for the probability of      at the second transition. These results 
provide evidence that start-ups tend to finance their projects through CVCs rather than 
IVCs when their intellectual property is effectively protected and their research pipelines 




Table 4.5. Hypothesis test using sequential logit regressions: Bench-mark results 
 
Panel A. Sequential logit regression: Bench-mark results 
 Sequential logit regression 



























































  (0.117) (0.152)     (0.150) (0.155) 
IP protection 









    (0.311) (0.329)   (0.461) (0.364) 
Future product 






















(0.141) (0.166) (0.147) (0.150) (0.131) (0.144) (0.134) (0.147) (0.163) (0.188) 
Internal R&D 
-0.161 0.075 -0.026 0.059 -0.059 -0.082 -0.025 -0.168 -0.004 0.057 
(0.134) (0.169) (0.145) (0.157) (0.137) (0.149) (0.130) (0.147) (0.159) (0.182) 









 -0.058 -0.074 -0.105 

















 -0.442 1.167 -0.732 1.243
*
 -0.526 1.009 





















 0.163 -0.222 0.299 -0.337 0.451
**
 -0.104 -0.116 




































(0.820) (0.770) (0.650) (0.923) (0.616) (0.802) (0.619) (0.763) (0.831) (0.763) 
           
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.5. continued 
 
N 950 943 950 939 932 
Log likelihood -757.837 -834.455 -848.570 -864.680 -683.204 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B. Sequential logit regression with hypothetical confounding variables 
 Sequential logit regression 




































       






     
  (0.114) (0.146)     
IP protection 




   
    (0.352) (0.367)   
Future product 





      (0.027) (0.039) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N 950 943 950 939 
Log likelihood -760.498 -834.852 -849.317 -864.780 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes. This table reports sequential logit regressions predicting the probabilities of start-ups’ financing through internal financing and external financing (i.e., 
IVCs or CVCs) at the first transition and the probabilities of start-ups’ financing through IVCs and CVCs at the second transition. Transitions denote the choice 
nodes presented in Figure 4.2. The transition of interest is the second transition. Panel A reports bench-mark results and the sequential logit regressions discussed 
in Section 3. The independent variables of interest are investor number, funding amount, IP protection, and future product. Control variables are firm size, 
internal R&D, patent stock, international business, location (U.S.), prior IVC, prior CVC, major investor, and year fixed effects. Panel B reports sequential logit 
regressions with hypothetical confounding variables. This estimation investigates how a confounding variable (i.e., an unobserved variable that is extraneous and 
correlates with both the dependent and independent variables) impacts the estimated results presented in Panel A. I use hypothetical confounding variables with 
correlation and standard deviation at 0.1. These four models demonstrate what can happen if the hypothetical confounding variable is correlated with investor 
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number (Model 1), funding amount (Model 2), IP protection (Model 3), and future product (Model 4). For the definitions of variables, please see Appendix B. 










Panel B reports sequential logit regressions with hypothetical confounding 
variables. This estimation investigates how a confounding variable (i.e., an unobserved 
variable that is extraneous and correlates with both the dependent and independent 
variables) impacts the estimated results presented in Panel A. I use hypothetical 
confounding variables with correlation and standard deviation fixed at 0.1. These four 
models demonstrate what can happen if the hypothetical confounding variable is 
correlated with investor number (Model 1), funding amount (Model 2), IP protection 
(Model 3), and future product (Model 4). Consistent with the results presented in Panel 
A, Models 1 and 2 indicate that investor number and funding amount have negative and 
significant coefficients for the probability of      at the second transition. In Models 3 
and 4, IP protection and future product indicate positive and significant coefficients for 
the probability of      at the second transition. These results alleviate the concerns 
about the existence of the potential confounding variable, suggesting that my findings 
presented in Panel A are robust to the potential confounding variable problem.   
Table 4.6 reports two-stage probit regressions that predict the probabilities of 
start-ups’ financing from CVCs and IVCs. Four models include the first-stage regressions 
of investor number (Model 1), funding amount (Model 2), IP protection (Model 3), and 
future product (Model 4). These four variables are instrumented by industry IPO, industry 
acquisition, and industry funding amount. For the definitions of these variables, please 
see Appendix B. The stage of interest is the second stage. In this stage, a dependent 
variable is the indicator variable that equals one (zero) if a start-up finances its project 
from CVCs (IVCs). Models 1 and 2 indicate that investor number and funding amount 
have negative and significant coefficients for the probability of      at the 1% level. 
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Models 3 and 4 indicate that IP protection and future product have positive and 
significant coefficients for the probability of      at the 1% level. These findings 
reduce concerns about endogeneity problem and are consistent with the findings 
presented in the sequential logit regressions. As a post estimation of two-stage probit 
regression, the Wald test of exogeneity is included. The significant Wald test statistic of 
exogeneity indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e., no correlation between the errors in the 
first- and second-stage regressions) is rejected, and thus the use of two-stage probit 
regression is supported. These test statistics are significant at the 1% level across models 




Table 4.6. Hypothesis test using two-stage probit regressions 
 
 Two-stage probit regression 


































       
 (0.074)       
Funding amount 
   -1.277
***
     
   (0.053)     
IP protection 
     3.065
***
   
     (0.139)   
Future product 
       0.293
***
 








 -0.101 0.623 -0.169
*
 













(0.055) (0.076) (0.055) (0.072) (0.026) (0.079) (0.303) (0.080) 









 0.189 -0.051 











(0.098) (0.176) (0.243) (0.281) (0.080) (0.250) (0.890) (0.240) 
Location (U.S.) 
-0.233 -0.014 0.059 0.176 0.139 -0.281 0.904 -0.216 
(0.172) (0.287) (0.226) (0.293) (0.109) (0.333) (0.755) (0.211) 
Prior IVC 




 0.056 -0.042 














 0.387 -0.104 















(0.072) (0.113) (0.084) (0.108) (0.035) (0.112) (0.618) (0.170) 
Industry IPO 
-0.017  -0.009  0.004  0.017  








  0.139  
(0.045)  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.095)  







  -0.429  
(0.047)  (0.061)  (0.022)  (0.261)  
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 -0.556 -0.793 0.812
**
 
(0.388) (0.405) (0.430) (0.366) (0.179) (0.396) (1.796) (0.378) 
         









N 554 552 554 553 
Log likelihood -750.676 -834.497 -351.698 -1.6e+03 
Prob>χ
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes. This table reports two-stage probit regressions predicting the probabilities of start-ups’ financing through corporate investors (CVCs) and independent 
venture capitalists (IVCs). Four models include the first-stage regressions of investor number (Model 1), funding amount (Model 2), IP protection (Model 3), and 
future product (Model 4). These four variables are instrumented by industry IPO, industry acquisition, and industry funding amount. The stage of interest is the 
second stage. In this stage, a dependent variable is the indicator variable that equals one (zero) if a start-up finances its project through CVCs (IVCs). The 
independent variables of interest are investor number, funding amount, IP protection, and future product. Control variables are firm size, internal R&D, patent 
stock, international business, location (U.S.), prior IVC, prior CVC, and major investor. As a post estimation of two-stage probit regression, the Wald test of 
exogeneity is included. The significant Wald test statistic of exogeneity indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e., no correlation between the errors in the first and 
second stage regressions) is rejected, and thus the use of two-stage probit regression is supported. For the definitions of variables, please see Appendix B. Robust 











Table 4.7 examines the robustness of my findings thus far and reports survival 
analysis regressions that predict the hazard (the intensity with which the event occurs) of 
start-ups’ financing through IVCs and CVCs. In Panel A, I estimate the following 
models:   ( )  (      ) , where    is the hazard for   (       ),   is the slope 
parameter, and    are categorical or continuous explanatory variables. Specifically, I use 
the Cox proportional hazard models, which assume that the covariates multiplicatively 
shift the baseline hazard function, in the analysis. These models make no assumption 
about the shape of hazard over time. The event (failure) is defined as start-ups’ financing 
from IVCs (    ) in Models 1 through 5 and CVCs (    ) in Models 6 through 10. 
Prior IVC, prior CVC, and major investor are excluded from the analysis because they 
have insufficient variances. The coefficients are the log hazard ratios. Models 1, 2, 6, and 
7 show that investor number and funding amount indicate greater coefficients for the 
hazard of      than that of     . In contrast, IP protection and future product indicate 
smaller coefficients for the hazard of      than that of     . Hence, my results thus 









=0.00), which suggests that the 
effects of these variables are significant at the 1% level in Models 1 through 5 and 




Table 4.7. Hypothesis test using survival analysis regressions 
 
Panel A. Cox proportional hazard regressions 
 Cox proportional hazard regressions 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 




    0.327
***
 -0.172    -0.132 
(0.102)    (0.127) (0.144)    (0.159) 
Funding amount 




   -0.233
**
 











  (0.210)  (0.223)   (0.268)  (0.293) 
Future product 

















 -0.083 0.023 0.080 0.047 -0.029 0.027 



















(0.175) (0.173) (0.178) (0.176) (0.181) (0.146) (0.143) (0.148) (0.148) (0.144) 







 -0.062 -0.027 -0.026 -0.010 -0.024 -0.009 
(0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
International business 
-0.703 -0.671 -0.600 -0.621 -0.623 -0.133 -0.158 -0.151 -0.073 -0.034 












 0.513 0.475 0.547 0.515 0.569 
(0.374) (0.404) (0.427) (0.392) (0.363) (0.667) (0.640) (0.645) (0.634) (0.594) 
           
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N 757 751 757 757 751 757 751 757 757 751 
Log likelihood -938.338 -926.710 -927.020 -941.441 -898.816 -1098.140 -1082.188 -1096.316 -1096.340 -1075.048 
pseudo R
2
 0.124 0.121 0.135 0.121 0.147 0.145 0.148 0.147 0.147 0.154 
 
Panel B. Post estimation of Cox proportional hazard regressions using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
 
         













Table 4.7. continued 
 




Notes. This table reports survival analysis regressions predicting the hazard (the intensity with which the event occurs) of start-ups’ financing through 
independent venture capitalists (IVCs) and corporate investors (CVCs). In Panel A, I estimate the following models:   ( )  (      ) , where    is the hazard 
for   (       ),   is the slope parameter, and    are categorical or continuous explanatory variables. Specifically, I use the Cox proportional hazard models, 
which assume that the covariates multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function, in the analyses. These models make no assumption about the shape of hazard 
over time. The event (failure) is defined as start-ups’ financing through IVCs (    ) in Models 1 through 5 and CVCs (    ) in Models 6 through 10. The 









=0.00), which suggests that the effects of these variables are significant at the 1% 
level in Models 1 through 5 and Models 6 through 10, respectively. Prior IVC, prior CVC, and major investor are excluded from the analyses because they have 
insufficient variances. The coefficients are the log hazard ratios. Panel B reports test statistics that examine whether or not the coefficients of the independent 
variables of interest estimated in Panel A are significantly different across two groups in which the events (failures) are defined as      and     . For 
example, the coefficients of investor number in Models 1 and 6 are estimated in independent equations. As a result, it is not clear whether or not these two 
coefficients are significantly different. To investigate this issue, I estimate seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models of the number of days from founding to 
the first financing by IVCs and CVCs, respectively. These SUR models are used to test and impose cross-equation constraints that are impossible in independent 
equation-by-equation hazard models used in Panel A. The significant value of the test statistic, Prob>χ
2
, indicates that the coefficients are significantly different. 












Panel B reports test statistics that examine whether or not the coefficients of the 
independent variables of interest estimated in Panel A are significantly different across 
two groups in which the events (failures) are defined as      and     . For example, 
the coefficients of investor number in Models 1 and 6 are estimated in independent 
equations. As a result, it is not testable whether or not these two coefficients are 
significantly different. To investigate this issue, I estimate seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) models of the number of days from founding to the first financing by IVCs and 
CVCs, respectively. These SUR models are used to test and impose cross-equation 
constraints that are impossible in independent equation-by-equation hazard models used 
in Panel A. The significant value of the test statistic, Prob>χ
2
, indicates that the 
coefficients are significantly different. The test statistics indicate that the coefficients of 
investor number, IP protection, and future product are significantly different across the 
two groups, by contrast with those for funding amount.  
4.4.3 Performance Metrics 
To estimate the performance metrics created by start-ups’ financing from CVCs 
and IVCs, I use a simple econometric approach that uses the predicted values of 
performance metrics, including Tobin’s q, valuation, and patent citation. Specifically, I 
estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models:       
       , where    is a set of performance metrics and    is a set of variables that may 
impact the performance metrics. These regressions are presented in Table 4.8. I predict 
base ŷ in the base regressions that do not include funding amount as an independent 
variable (i.e., Models 1, 3, and 5). I also predict treated ŷ in the treated regressions that do 
include funding amount as an independent variable (i.e., Models 2, 4, and 6). I then 
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calculate the differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ (i.e., treated ŷ-base ŷ) and use 
these differences as a proxy for the effects of IVC and CVC financing on the 
performance metrics. Because treated ŷ can be viewed as a projection onto the linear 
space spanned by funding amount, which is not projected in base ŷ, along with   , the 
differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ can be understood as the effects of IVC and 
CVC financing separated from those of other factors (i.e.,   ) on the performance 
metrics.  
Table 4.8. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for estimating predicted values 
 
 OLS regressions 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Tobin’s q Valuation Patent citation 









 (0.099)  (0.509)  (0.336) 
Investor number 
-10.900 -8.650 -2.175 -36.691 8.713 13.308 
(13.276) (13.264) (37.337) (33.864) (22.119) (22.361) 
IP protection 
-1.674 13.033 -117.236 -67.377 -72.948 -68.553 
































 33.516 10.148 1.633 3.354 
(9.156) (9.185) (35.940) (33.200) (21.291) (21.922) 










(3.647) (3.608) (16.815) (15.138) (9.961) (9.995) 
International business 









 178.544 -69.622 -65.983 






 -34.796 -34.351 
(20.654) (20.597) (70.605) (64.388) (41.827) (42.516) 
Prior CVC 
1.795 2.888 -32.270 -14.581 -12.335 -12.725 
(11.742) (11.614) (48.005) (43.471) (28.439) (28.704) 
Major investor 
-24.044 -18.763 -101.484 -23.530 12.632 7.676 
(14.948) (14.853) (66.245) (59.768) (39.244) (39.465) 
Constant 
-73.910 -66.997 -405.243 -277.601 109.379 90.211 
(127.180) (101.817) (296.665) (267.362) (175.747) (176.540) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 495 493 939 932 939 932 
F 8.461 8.818 12.723 22.242 19.509 18.849 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.362 0.380 0.303 0.442 0.400 0.402 
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Notes. This table reports OLS regressions predicting performance metrics including Tobin’s q, valuation, 
and patent citation. I estimate the following models:              , where    is a set of performance 
metrics and    is a set of variables that may impact the performance metrics. I predict base ŷ in the base 
regressions that do not include funding amount as an independent variable (i.e., Models 1, 3, and 5). I also 
predict treated ŷ in the treated regressions that do include funding amount as an independent variable (i.e., 
Models 2, 4, and 6). I then calculate the differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ (i.e., treated ŷ-base ŷ) and 
use these differences as a proxy for the effects of IVC and CVC financing on the performance metrics. 
Because treated ŷ can be viewed as a projection onto the linear space spanned by funding amount, which is 
not projected in base ŷ, along with   , the differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ can be understood as 
the effects of IVC and CVC financing separated from those of other factors (i.e.,   ) on the performance 







 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Table 4.9 reports start-ups’ performance metrics associated with financing 
through IVCs and CVCs. Panel A reports two-sample t-tests that examine whether or not 
the means of performance metrics, which are calculated from two groups of start-ups 
financed from IVCs and CVCs, are significantly different. This approach is a naïve 
approach that simply compares the means of performance metrics without separating and 
estimating the effects of IVC and CVC financing on the performance metrics. As a result, 
it is not clear whether the differences between the means of performance metrics are 
attributable to IVC and CVC financing or other factors that may impact the performance 
metrics. This table indicates that start-ups have significantly greater Tobin’s q, valuation, 
and patent citation when they finance their projects from CVCs than IVCs.      
Table 4.9. Hypothesis test using several performance metrics 
 
Panel A. Means of several performance metrics between two groups of start-ups: Naïve approach  
































N 1880 719  
 
Panel B. Means of several performance metrics generated from predicted values: Better approach  
 IVC CVC Difference 
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N 277 274 
 
Notes. This table reports start-ups’ performance metrics associated with financing through independent 
venture capitalists (IVCs) and corporate investors (CVCs). These performance metrics include Tobin’s q, 
valuation, and patent citations. Panel A reports two-sample t-tests that examine whether or not the means of 
performance metrics, which are calculated from two groups of start-ups financed through IVCs and CVCs, 
are significantly different. This approach simply compares the means of performance metrics without 
separating and estimating the effects of IVC and CVC financing on the performance metrics. As a result, it 
is not clear whether the differences between the means of performance metrics come from IVCs and CVCs 
financing or other factors that may impact the performance metrics. Panel B reports two-sample t-tests that 
examine whether or not the means of new performance metrics, which are estimated by using the 
regressions presented in Table 4.8 and thus separate and estimate the effects of IVC and CVC financing on 
the performance metrics, are significantly different. For the definitions of variables, please see Appendix B. 






 denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
Panel B reports two-sample t-tests that examine whether or not the means of new 
performance metrics, which are estimated using the regressions presented in Table 4.8 
and thus separate and estimate the effects of IVC and CVC financing on the performance 
metrics, are significantly different. Interestingly, inconsistent with the results presented in 
Panel A, start-ups indicate significantly greater Tobin’s q and valuation when they 
finance their projects from IVCs than CVCs. In contrast, start-ups indicate significantly 
greater patent citation when they raise funds from CVCs than IVCs. These mixed results 
suggest that it is hard to determine which financing source is absolutely more beneficial 
for start-ups than other sources. Rather, these results suggest that, while IVCs tend to 
create greater managerial value (i.e., Tobin’s q and valuation) for start-ups, CVCs tend to 
create greater technological value (e.g., patent citation) for start-ups. These results 
support Hypothesis 4.   
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4.5 Conclusions  
In this paper I present an analytical framework and empirical evidence to address 
the issues regarding start-ups’ financing choice between IVCs and CVCs and its 
performance implications by highlighting the contextual factors that may impact the 
choice. My theoretical and empirical investigation suggests that start-ups that possess 
better evaluated technology tend to finance their projects from IVCs rather than CVCs. In 
contrast, start-ups tend to finance their projects from CVCs rather than IVCs when their 
technology is effectively protected and their research pipelines contain multiple products. 
While financing from IVCs contributes to increasing start-ups’ Tobin’s q and valuation, 
financing from CVCs contributes to enhancing start-ups’ forward patent citations.    
Beyond providing a broad bench-mark for start-ups’ financing choice and its 
performance implications, this study has important implications for start-ups and 
entrepreneurial investors. First, it implies that the risk of appropriation is an important 
factor that impacts start-ups’ financing choice. This implication is important because 
much of the existing literature, with just a few exceptions, has emphasized CVCs as an 
alternative financing source without appropriate caution. Second, this study implies that 
each type of investor can fulfill different needs for start-ups. This implication can open a 
new avenue of future research that addresses what different types of investors do and how 
they interact with each other in the entrepreneurial finance market. This line of study can 
make it possible for start-ups to effectively pursue the ability to create synergies with 
different types of investors to capture managerial and technological resources as well as 
financial capital.     
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To conclude this paper, some limitations of the study are discussed. The first 
obvious limitation is that my findings are limited to the context of the bio-pharmaceutical 
industry. To the extent that the motivations and consequences of CVCs vary across 
industries, my findings should be interpreted with caution when they are applied in the 
contexts of other industries. Furthermore, due to the exploratory nature of this study, I 
had little theoretical and empirical guidance from the existing literature. As a result, my 




Variable Description Data sources 
Cash flow 
Net income after interest and taxes plus depreciation and 
amortization in year t 
Compustat 
CVC amount Amount of CVC investments by firm i in year t Deloitte Recap 
CVC average amount Yearly mean of CVC amount of all sample firms in year t Deloitte Recap 
CVC fraction Number of firms making CVC investments in year t Deloitte Recap 
External R&D 
Number of alliances stock, including licensing, strategic alliances, 
and acquisitions, in year t 
Deloitte Recap 
Financial return 
Geometric average return. I construct this variable (  ) as follows: 
   (    )
 
   , where    is the geometric average return 
applicable on each subset period n,    is the cumulative return over 
the entire period, and n is the number of equal subset periods to 
average the return. For the sample in which CVC investments are 
made in pre-IPO portfolios that go public afterward,    is estimated 
by using IPO price per share. For the sample in which CVC 
investments are made in post-IPO portfolios or pre-IPO portfolios 
that do not go public afterward,    is estimated by using the last 
funding activity price. The last funding activity includes acquisition 
and other forms of fund-raising activities by portfolios. I finally 
calculated the weighted mean of    with amounts invested 
individual CVC investments for firm i in year t.  
Deloitte Recap 
Financial return rank 
Ranking variable of financial return. The greater ranking denotes 
the greater financial return. 
Deloitte Recap 
Growth rate 




Indicator variable that equals one if firm i is headquartered in U.S. 
and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Internal R&D (t) R&D expenses in year t Compustat 
Internal R&D (t-1) R&D expenses estimated in year t-1 Compustat 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets in year t Compustat 
Multinationality 
Indicator variable that equals one if firm i manages its business in 
more than one country and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Number of products (pre-
clinical) 
Number of products within pre-clinical stage in year t PharmaProjects 
Number of products (total) Total number of products within stage I, II, and III in year t  PharmaProjects 
Number of products 
(weighted) 
Number of products weighted by the probabilities of advancing to 
the next stage within stage I, II, and III in year t  
PharmaProjects 
Patents Number of patents applied in year t NBER 
Post-IPO 
Indicator variable that equals one if firm i makes CVC investments 
in post-IPO portfolios and zero otherwise 
Deloitte Recap 
R&D intensity (t) 
R&D expenses divided by total assets (e.g., R&D expenses/total 
assets) in year t 
Compustat 
R&D intensity (t-1) R&D intensity estimated in year t-1 Compustat 
Return type 
Sub-group I or IV. I split the sample between CVC investments 
generating technological and financial returns above and below the 
means, respectively. Group I represents CVC investments resulted 
in low technological return and low financial return; group II in low 
technological return and high financial return; group III in high 
technological return and low financial return; and group IV in high 
technological return and high financial return. 
All sources 
SIC (28) Indicator variable that equals one if the first two digits of SIC code Compustat 
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are 28 and zero otherwise 
Size Log of total assets in year t Compustat 
Technological diversity 
1/(1+the number of patents that share first three digits of patent 




Differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ (e.g., treated ŷ-base ŷ) 
estimated from Models 5 and 6 in Table 3.1 
All sources 
Technological return (t) Technological return (weighted) in year t All sources 
Technological return (t+1) Technological return (weighted) in year t+1 All sources 
Technological return (t+2) Technological return (weighted) in year t+2 All sources 
Technological return (total) 
Differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ (e.g., treated ŷ-base ŷ) 




Differences between treated ŷ and base ŷ (e.g., treated ŷ-base ŷ) 
estimated from Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.1 
All sources 
Technological return (t) rank 
Ranking variable of technological return (t). The greater ranking 





Chosen (  ) 
A ternary variable that equals zero if a start-up finances its project 
through internal financing (    ), one if through IVCs (    ), and 
two if through CVCs (    ). Syndicated investments made by both 
IVCs and CVCs are categorized by the natures of leading investors (i.e., 
CVCs or IVCs). 
Firm size Log of total assets of start-up 
Funding amount Log of amount of investment calculated in millions of U.S. dollars 
Funding amount (dollar 
value) 
Amount of investment calculated in millions of U.S. dollars 
Future product Number of products (i.e., drugs) in pre-clinical stage 
Industry acquisition Number of acquisitions in the bio-pharmaceutical industry in a year 
Industry funding amount 
Amount of investments made by IVCs and CVCs in the bio-
pharmaceutical industry in a year 
Industry IPO Number of IPOs in the bio-pharmaceutical industry in a year 
Internal R&D Log of R&D expenditures of start-up 
International business 
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up is involved with 
international business and zero otherwise 
Investor number Number of investors in an investment 
IP protection 
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up finances its project in 
the stages later than Series C (i.e., the median of financing stages in the 
sample) and zero otherwise 
Location (U.S.) 
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up is headquartered in U.S. 
and zero otherwise 
Major investor 
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up finances its project 
through major CVCs or IVCs listed in Table 4.1 and zero otherwise  
Patent citation Number of patents that cite a start-up’s patents 
Patent stock 
Cumulative number of patents applied by a start-up (depreciated 15% 
annually) 
Prior CVC  
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up has previously financed 
its project through CVCs and zero otherwise 
Prior IVC 
An indicator variable that equals one if a start-up has previously financed 
its project through IVCs and zero otherwise 
Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q is approximated as follows: Approximate q = 
(MVE+PS+DEBT)/TA, where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price 
and the number of common stock shares outstanding, PS is the liquidating 
value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the 
firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets, plus the book 
value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the book value of the total 
assets of the firm. 
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